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COMMENTS
STANDING TO CHALLENGE EXCLUSIONARY ZONING IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS
INTRODUCTION
Municipalities traditionally have had broad powers to control the
uses to which property owners may put their land through the enact-
ment of local zoning ordinances. In recent years, substantial attention
has been focused on one specific effect of local zoning ordinances: the
exclusion of the poor and minorities from suburban communities,'
and its resulting negative impact on metropolitan growth and
development. 2 Parties who have perceived their interests as being ad-
versely affected by the exclusionary aspects of local zoning ordinances
have turned to state and federal courts to challenge such ordinances.
However, these challenges have often been blocked by (1) the pre-
sumption of the constitutional validity of local zoning ordinances; and
(2) the inability of plaintiffs to establish standing to maintain their
suit.
I. Zoning and the Presumption of Validity: Some
Social Ramifications
Fifty years ago, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 3 the Su-
preme Court first considered whether a comprehensive zoning
scheme which restricted the uses to which a landowner could put his
land constituted a "taking" of property in violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The Court held that zoning
plans were presumptively a valid exercise of the state police power un-
less demonstrated to be clearly arbitrary, unreasonable and having no
substantial relation to the public health, morals or general welfare.'
' See, e.g., R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, ENCLUSIONARY ZONING (1973); C. HAAR &
1). 1ATRIDIS, HOUSING THE POOR IN SUBURBIA: 13 1.1 .111AG POLICY AT TIIE GRASS ROOTS (1974);
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN; EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING (1975) (hereinafter cited as TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN];
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA (1974)
[hereinafter cited as EQUAI. OPPORTUNITY]; Branfman, Cohen Trubek, Measuring the
Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483
(1973).
2 See, EQUAL OP PORTUN IT V, SUPra note 1, at 29.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
' 272 U.S. at 384. Prior to 1926, the Court had invalidated a zoning ordinance
based on race, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 62 (1917), and had upheld ordinances
excluding certain noxious trades and businesses which could be considered nuisances or
which threatened the public health, see, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Reinman v, City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), but the Court had never
considered a comprehensive plan.
Id. at 395. In upholding the legitimacy of residential zoning the Court referred
to apartments as "mere parasite[s], constructed in order to take advantage of the open
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Although the Court thus set forth a st ng presumption in favor of
the constitutionality of zoning, it did lea e open the possibility that in
certain instances "the general public in erest would so far outweigh
the interest of the municipality that the unicipality would not be al-
lowed to stand in the way." 6
After presenting this caveat to ion' g boards, the Court adopted
a hands-off attitude with regard to mu icipal zoning. For over forty
years, it deferred to judgment of lo al authorities by dismissing
appeals or denying petitions for certior ri. 7
 In cases tangentially re-
lated to land use and zoning, the Cour, in dictum, reaffirmed its
Euclid position that local-
 ordina ces would be presumed
constitutional. 8
 As a result of this strop and long-standing presump-
tion, courts have generally upheld, as r lating to the public welfare,
many variations of zoning legislation w ch tend to exclude the poor
from more affluent communities. 9
spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district ...
[and which] come very near to being nuisances." Id. at 394 .-95:
Id. at 390.
E.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township o Wayne, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (per
curiam) (appeal dismissed for want of a substan ial federal question); see Johnson,
Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAM & CONTEMN. PROB. 199, 208 (1955)
and cases cited therein; Sager, Tight Little Islands: :xclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN, L. REV. 767, 783 (1969) The sole exception was Nectow v.
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In Nectow, a the -recent zoning ordinance caused a
portion of the plaintiffs land to be classified as res dential whereas the greater portion
of the plaintiff's land was in the nuts-restricted bus ness district and the land itself was
near an auto assembly plant and a soap factory. Id. at 186. The classification of part of
the plaintiff's land as residential precluded the plai tiff from fulfilling a contract to sell
his land. The Supreme Court found that the cla sification could not be justified as
promoting the health, safety or general welfare of t e town. Id. at 188. Therefore, since
there was no basis for the "invasion of the proper" of the plaintiff, the zoning ordi-
nance deprived plaintiff of his property without du process of law. Id. at 185, 188-89.
8 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (19 4) where the Court noted:
[I]t is within the power of the legislature to termine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spa ions as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In t present case, the Congress
and its authorized agencies have made dete minations that take into ac-
count a wide variety of values. It is not for u to reappraise them. if those
who govern the District of Columbia deci e that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, th re is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way.
Id. at 33; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 25, 328 (1927). In 1974, the Court
departed from its practice of denying review in zoning cases. In deciding Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974), the Court reaffirmed the rationale es-
paused in Euclid. The zoning ordinance in questio restricted the number of unrelated
adults who could live in a single dwelling unit. Th Court refused to view the zoning
ordinance as one which impinged upon any constit tionally protected rights. Rather, it
analyzed the ordinance as the type of "economic an social legislation where legislatures
have historically drawn lines which we respect ag ins) the charge of violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, if the law be 'reasonable, of arbitrary. — Id. at 8, quoting F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1 20).
° State courts have traditionally upheld such xclusionary devices as minimum lot
area regulations, e.g., Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 643,
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The willingness of the Court to presume a local zoning ordi-
nance valid unless shown to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable has
left the control of land development to the discretion of local
authorities."' Thus, policy decisions concerning land use have been
guided largely by municipal self-interest." The Report of the Na-
tional Commission on Urban Problems, released in 1968, pointed to
two such local interests which have characterized zoning decisions
since Euclid. First is the municipality's desire to maintain control over
the nature of the local environment: "The buyers and sellers of lots
needed some device to prevent a drop . in property values, keep
out unwanted intrusions, encourage investment in land and
construction—in sum, to assure character." 12 Second, insofar as local
governments rely heavily on property 'taxes to meet the municipality's
financial needs, there is an interest in using the zoning power to raise
the local tax base." This practice, known as fiscal zoning, attempts to
eliminate the possibility of developments that might result in a net fi-
nancial burden, and to encourage developments which will probably
yield a net financial gain." Where the goal of the municipality is to
achieve fiscal balance, there is an incentive to exclude low- and
moderate-income housing because it produces lower tax revenue than
luxury housing.' 5 In addition, it is generally feared that low-income
families, which tend to be larger, require greater expenditures by the
655, 326 N.E.2d 022, 927 (two acre minimum lot size upheld); floor area restrictions,
e.g. Flower Hill Bldg. Corp. v. Village of Flower Hill, 199 Misc. 344, 348, 100 N.Y.S. 2d
903, 908 (Sup. Ct.. 1950) (minimum 1800 square feet of livable floor area upheld); and
restrictions on the number of multiple unit dwellings (see generally Babcock & Boss&
man, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, Ill U. PA, L. REY. 1040, 1060-61 (1963)
for a discussion of some techniques used to restrict the use of multiple-family dwellings
which have been upheld by the courts) on the grounds that these devices are valid ex-
ercises of police power. But see N.A.A.C.P. v, Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
163-64, 185-87, 336 A.2d 713, 719, 730-32 (1975) (one-half acre minimum lot size and
minimum 1,100 square feet for one-story houses and 1,300 square feet tier one and
one-half stories or higher held invalid); Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 478,
268 A.2d 765, 770 (1970) (two and three acre lot size invalid). The latter two cases are
indicative of a recent trend in the opposite direction. A detailed review of state court
responses to exclusionary zoning is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally
TWENTY YEARS All :R BROWN, supra note 1, at 109-14 (discussion of recent trend of
courts to invalidate exclusionary devices). Comment, A Survey of the Judicial Responses to
Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYR. L. Roi. 537 (1971) (discussion of the traditional response of
state courts to uphold exclusionary devices). See text at notes 41-48 kr a brief overview
of challenges to exclusionary zoning brought in the lower federal courts.
'" Comment, 42 TEMP. L. Q. 347, 347-48 (1970); see R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN,
supra note I, at 4.
" EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 1, at 29, 30. See BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY:
REPORT or THE NATIONAL. COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS TO THE CONGRESS mai To
THE Nu:su:NT or THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 211
(1968) [hereinafter cited as REPou'r oN URBAN PROBLEMS/.
12 REPORT ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 18-19.
' 3 1(1. at 19.
" Id.
Ard.
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municipality for education, public health, welfare, police and fire pro-
tection than are necessary for higher income families."
To avoid these perceived drains on its economy, a municipality
might draw upon a wide variety of exclusionary practices. For exam-
ple, a municipality might: (1) impose unduly large minimum lot size
requirements, which have the effect of significantly inflating the cost
of entry into the market; (2) mandate minimum floor space require-
ments, often considerably larger than necessary, which effectively
raise the cost of homes in the municipality beyond the financial means
of all but a few persons; (3) prohibit the construction of multiple-
family dwellings; and (4) exclude mobile homes." When zoning
caught hold in the 1920's such practices may have been relatively be-
nign. Because they were not being effectuated during a period of
region-wide metropolitan growth, the zoning decisions of the com-
munity did not affect bordering communities." Municipalities in the
1970's, however, make their land use decisions in a much different
context—that of continued, large scale metropolitan expansion." It is
important to highlight several characteristics of this widespread met-
ropolitan growth in order to appreciate the present effect of local zon-
ing decisions.
Most of the recent urban growth has occurred in the suburbs
surrounding the major cities. 2° The flight to the suburbs resulted in
the creation of thousands of new units of local government, each hav-
ing the power to make zoning decisions according to its own
self-interest." The National Commission on Urban Problems points
out that this often results in "a type of Balkanization which is intoler-
able in large urban areas where local government boundaries rarely
reflect the true economic and social watersheds."22 This dispersion of
16 Id.
37 For a general discussion of exclusionary devices, see, e.g., R. BAiteoex & F.
Bossi:i.mAN,supra note 1, at 5-14; REPORT or' URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 213-16;
Williams, jr. & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New
Jersey, 22 SYR. L. REV. 475, 481-98 (1971); Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling
Community Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 370.
18 See R. flAtictick & F. BossEDJAN„tupra note 1, at 28.
From 1951 to 1976, almost as much land was converted to urban use in the
United States as in the preceding 175 years of the country's existence. M. BROOKS,
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 1 (ASPO Planning Advisory Serv. Rep. No. 254, 1970). By 1960,
70% of the population lived in urban areas; 63% lived in metropolitan areas. REPORT
ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 42. The United States Commission on Urban
Problems has noted that large scale metropolitan growth "has come to characterize the
pattern of American settlement. Roughly defined, it encompasses a city of more than
50,000 and the counties which contain it and maintain a certain economic and social
dependence on it." Id. An estimated 71% of the total U.S. population will live in met-
ropolitan areas by 1985. 80.6% of the projected population growth will occur inside
these metropolitan areas. Id.
" M. BitooKs. supra note 19, at 1.
21 See R. BABCOCK & F. BossELmAti.supra note I, at 4.
22 REPORT ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 19; see Note, Suburban Zoning
Ordinances and Building Codes: Their Effect on Low and Moderate Income Rousing, 45
NOTRE DAME L.Q. 123, 130 (1969).
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zoning, authority has led to incompatible uses along jurisdictional bor-
ders, the near exclusion of regional facilities, and a duplication of
public facilities." In short, the widespread distribution of zoning au-
thorities has often frustrated attempts to achieve sound metropolitan
plan ning."
Metropolitan growth has also involved a massive movement of
employment activities away from the central city into the suburbs and
outlying areas." Low- and moderate-income persons find themselves
foreclosed from these new jobs because zoning practices effectively
prevent them from moving to the suburbs, and they are unable to af-
ford the cost of commuting the physical distance between their resi-
dence in the city and the new job locations in the suburbs. Their in-
ability to obtain this employment, compounded by the steady disap-
pearance of employment opportunities within the central cities, pre-
vents them from acquiring the very financial means needed to move
into suburban communities. 2R Thus a bottleneck is placed on regional
mobility and development by zoning practices which exclude low-
income housing from suburban communities, thereby separating po-
tential employees from growing job markets. 27
An additional characteristic of the present pattern of metropoli-
tan growth is its corresponding racial imbalance." The exclusionary
practices of suburban communities which prevent the construction of
homes within the financial means of a low-income family have a dis-
proportionate effect on blacks who, as a group, suffer a significantly
higher incidence of poverty than the population at large. 29
 Thus the
movement of whites from the inner cities to the suburbs and the
maintenance of financial barriers through exclusionary zoning tech-
niques which effectively exclude low-income individuals, also impedes
the possibility of integrated housing patterns within a metropolitan
23 REPORT M' URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 19.
24 hi.
21
 M. BROOKS, supra note 19, at 2. More than one-half of all new employment
created in the I960's was created outside central cities. From 1960-1967, 62% of the in-
dustrial arid 52% ()I' the commercial buildings constructed were built outside of central
cities. Id.
"See Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning after Valtierra and
Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61, 62 (197 1).
27
 Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls,
22 SYR, L. REV, 509, 513 (197
2' EQUAL OPPORTUNPiv„rupra note 1, at 7. In 1968, 95% of the metropolitan sub-
urbs of one million or more persons were white. M. BROOKS, 511kra note 19, at 2.
Moreover, the movement or whites away from the central city to the suburbs has been
shown to be increasing. hi. Between 1960 and 1970 nearly two million whites moved
out of the cities while the concentration of blacks increased by nearly three million.
During the same time period the white suburban population has increased by 12.5 mil-
lion, whereas only one million blacks have moved to the suburbs. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY,
supra note 1, at 4. In nearly one-third of the metropolitan areas having a population of
at least one million, the percentage of black residents in suburban communities has
either remained stable or declined in the 1960's. Id.
2" EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 1, at 7..
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region." The net effect is to place resources such as open land and
employment at the disposal of the predominantly white middle class
suburbs" while the central cities, drained of their tax base, struggle
with the problems of providing decent housing, job opportunities, and
adequate services."
2. The Problem of Establishing Standing to Challenge
Exclusionary Zoning
In recent years there has been a growing realization that ex-
clusionary zoning policies often result in serious economic and social
dislocation." Even so, federal litigation involving exclusionary zoning
has been relatively sparse. 34 One factor responsible for the minimal
judicial intervention is that those who are excluded by the ordinances
are not the individuals who have traditionally been recognized as hav-
ing standing to challenge zoning practices.
Challenges to municipal zoning ordinances have traditionally
been heard in state courts rather than federal courts. State courts
generally have jurisdiction to hear such challenges pursuant to the in-
dividual state's zoning enabling act," which typically provides that
"appeals may be taken to a Court by a 'person aggrieved' . . . by any de-
cision of the administrative officer."36 To qualify as a "person ag-
grieved" one must allege some direct legal or equitable property in-
terest in a parcel of land, the proper zoning of which is the subject of
the dispute before the court. 37 Persons who are not owners of the
land actually zoned qualify as "persons aggrieved" only when some
"special damages which are not generally shared with other property
owners similarly situated" can be proved." The general rule in regard
to non-residents is that they do not have the right to appeal decisions
of another district's zoning board. 39 Also, civic and improvement as-
sociations seeking review typically have not been granted the right of
3° See id. at 4; Comment, 47 Tut.. L. RE A% 1056 (1973).
3 ' Note, The Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law: First Breach in the Exclusionary Wall,
54 B.U.L. RF.v. 37, 45 (1974).
" Note, supra note 22, at 130.
33 REPORT ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note II, at 19.
31 See TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN, supra note 1, at 91.
"Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 294
(1967).
3" ld.
37 Id. at 301; see, e.g., Flynn v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the City of Pawtucket, 77
R.I. 118, 122, 73 A.2d 808, 810 (1950); Scholl v. Borough of Yeadon, 148 Pa. Super.
601, 606, 26 A.2d 135, 137 (1942).
3" Note, supra note 35, at 302-03; see, e.g., Downey v. Village of Ardsley, 152
N.Y.S.2d 195, 199 (Sup. Ct. 1956), affd mem., 3 App. Div. 2d 663, 664, 158 N.Y.S.2d
306, 308 (1957).
" Note, supra note 35, at 304; see, e.g., Wood v. Freeman 43 Misc.2d 616, 619,
251 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (1969); Village of Russell Gardens v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
30 Misc.2d 392, 399, 219 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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appeal, as ordinarily they do not own realty and therefore are neither
taxpayers nor aggrieved parties. 4 "
In the federal courts, challenges to exclusionary zoning have fb-
cused on the racially discriminatory purpose and effect of zoning or-
dinances, rather than on the particular zoning devices used. Since
1890, ordinances expressly providing for residential racial segregation
have been struck down by the federal courts.' [
 However, it was not
until 1970 that plaintiffs attempted to challenge exclusionary zoning
ordinances that were not explicitly enacted for the purpose of racial
segregation." These challenges were typically brought either by as-
sociations which had purchased or taken an option on property with
the intent to develop low- or moderate-income housing, 43
 or by per-
sons eligible and willing to move into such projects. 44 All the suits
were brought when building plans already underway were blocked by
such town actions as rezoning or attempting to rezone the area re-
served for the project; 45
 instituting a referendum nullifying the ordi-
nance permitting the proposed project," or denying a request for a
building permit and zoning change which would allow construction of
low-income multi-family dwellings:" Each challenge was viewed and
decided by the courts as a race discrimination case."
4 " "Where the association does not own any real estate in the zoning district, the
courts have denied the right of review, since one without ownership cannot be ad-
versely affected." Note, supra note 35, at 306; see, e.g., Stocksdale v. Barnard, 239 Md,
541, 543-44, 212 A.2(1 282, 283-84 (1965); Lindenwood lmprov. Ass'n v. Lawrence, 278
S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), Even where challenges have been brought by par-
ties traditionally considered "persons aggrieved," state courts have frequently upheld
exclusionary devices. See note 9 supra.
" E.g., Buchanan v. Watley, 245 U.S.60 (1917); In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359, 361
1890).
42 See Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037
(loth Cir. 1970); Southern Alameda Span. Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424
F,2d 291(9th Cir. 1970),
43
 E.g., Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th
Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 109 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037,
1038 (10th Or. 1970).
44 E.g., Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1'208, 1210 &
n.2 (8th Cir. 1972); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1038 (10th Cir. 1970); Sis-
ters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v.. City of Evanston, 335 F. Stipp, 396, 398
(N.D. Ill. 1971).
43
 Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1211 (8th Cir.
1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 109 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
Southern Alameda Span. Speaking Org. v. City of' Union City, 424 F.2d 291,
292 (9th Cir. 1970).
47
 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1038 (10th Cir. 1970); Sisters of
Providence of St, Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Stipp. 396, 398 (N.D.
III. 1971).
18 See Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th
Cir. 1972); cf. Ybarra v. City of the Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 252.53 (9th
Cir. 1974).
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The federal courts have had little trouble granting standing to
such plaintiffs challenging exclusionary zoning where there was an ac-
tual property interest involved; where low-income non-residents were
ready, willing, and able to move into a specific project planned for
that property; and where the zoning ordinance preventing low-
income housing construction has been challenged on the basis of a
racially discriminatory purpose and effect." However, until mid-1975,
the Supreme Court had yet to decide whether developers who desire
to build and non-residents who desire to live in low- or moderate-cost
housing in a particular municipality have standing to challenge that
municipality's zoning practices where (I) the practices have effectively
discouraged building activity, such that developers have neither
purchased land in the municipality nor begun plans for the particular
project, or (2) discrimination on the basis of wealth is alleged, with
racial discrimination being asserted as a secondary effect of the
economically exclusionary practices. It is the purpose of this comment
to examine the question of standing to challenge exclusionary zoning
ordinances in the context of these two fact situations.
The comment will first present a short overview of the doctrine
of standing. Special emphasis will be given to the question of whether
the courts impose different requirements for standing depending
upon the source of the plaintiffs claim; that is, whether plaintiffs as-
serting claims based on statutes providing for judicial review are in a
better position to establish standing than plaintiffs asserting claims
based on common law or constitutional rights. The next section will
explore the difficulties created when the standing doctrine is applied
to individuals petitioning the federal courts to order suburban com-
munities to change their zoning laws and to allow construction of
low-income housing. It will present a detailed analysis of three recent
zoning cases, Warth v. Seldin," decided in 1975 by the Supreme
Court, Evans v. Lynn, 5 ' decided later in the same year by the Second
Circuit, and City of Hartford v. Hills, 52 decided in 1976 by a district
court in the Second Circuit. In the final section of this comment, the
implications of these doctrines for future challenges to exclusionary
zoning will be discussed. It will be submitted that as a result of the
Supreme Court's pronouncements in Warth, plaintiffs finding them-
selves in the fact situations under study are likely to establish standing
to challenge zoning in only a very narrow set of circumstances.
" Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1040
(10th Cir. 1970); Southern Alameda Span. Speaking org. v. City of Union Cit y , 424
F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1970).
3" 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
51 — F.2d —; Nu. 74-1793 (2d Cir. _June 2, 1975), rehearing rn bane
granted, August II, 1975. The text of this opinion can be found at l'-H 1971 EQUAL.
OPPORT. IN HOUSING 11 3 ; 712,
ax —F. Supp.—; Civil No. H-75-258 (D. Conn. Jan. 28, 1976). The text of
this opinion can be found at P-H 1971 EQUAL, OPPORT. IN HOUSING 113.742.
•
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Moreover, even where such plaintiffs are able to establish standing,
the relief afforded is likely to be of a very limited and generally in-
adequate nature.
1. THE STANDING DOCTRINE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
There are two principal sources of the requirements for stand-
ing in the federal courts. First is Article III of the Constitution which
defines and limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to "cases" and
"controversies."55 To assure a concrete case or controversy, courts
have consistently required plaintiffs to allege, at a minimum, that they
have been or will be sufficiently injured in fact, economically or
otherwise, as to have a personal stake in the outcome." Second is a
jurisprudential concern that the court not exceed the bounds of
proper judicial inquiry mandated by the separation of powers
doctrine." As a result of this concern, the Supreme Court has often
required plaintiffs to allege that the injury asserted violates a "legal
right" personal to the plaintiffs." The extent to which the federal
courts insist that the jurisprudential requirements be satisfied often
depends on the nature of the claim upon which plaintiffs sue; that is,
whether plaintiffs' claim arises (1) without the aid of a statute specifi-
cally providing for judicial review of congressional or executive action
(nonstatutory review); 57 (2) under a specific statutory grant of review
(statutory review); or (3) under the review provisions of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. 58
In a nonstatutory review case, Congress has not specifically pro-
vided for judicial review of the governmental action being challenged.
Thus the Court's concern that it not exceed the bounds of proper ju-
ducial inquiry is particularly acute. To allay this concern, the Supreme
Court has required that the injury mandated by Article III be to a
53 Mast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-5 (1968).
"See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
220-21 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411, 423 (1969); Mast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962). But see Linda R.S. v. Richard 0., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)
where the Court suggested that "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the stat-
ute."
55
 Mast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1967); see United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 179 (1974); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940).
" Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S, 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S, 464,
479 (1938); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943); Scott, Standing
in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86 Haftv. L. REV, 645, 649-50 (1973).
57 In these cases, judicial review is obtained by invoking a general jurisdictional
grant or remedy, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1970). See Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist.
No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 94-98 (8th Cir. 1956); Scott, supra note 56, at 647-48.
58 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
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specific "legal right."" Plaintiffs cannot use the Court to vindicate a
general grievance shared in common by large segments of the public"
but must assert the violation of a particular interest of their own
which is based on a common law right, 61
 a constitutional right" or a
statutory right." One aspect of this requirement is the ban on tax-
payer suits. 64
 The Court has traditionally held that a taxpayer chal-
lenging a statute or governmental action must demonstrate that he
will suffer a direct injury as a result of its enforcement and "not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way with people
generally."65
A second implication of the requirement of injury to a specific
legal right is that the Court generally will not allow plaintiffs to rest
their claims on the rights of third parties." The Court has noted, how-
ever, that this requirement is merely a "rule of practice"" and other
countervailing factors have often precluded its application." One such
factor is the existence of a close or significant relationship between
the plaintiffs and the third parties whose rights are being asserted. 69
"See cases and Note cited at 56 supra.
60
 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974);
United States v, Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1974); Perkins v, Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937); Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
" Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969).
62
 N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).
"Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); Trafficante v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, Blackman & Powell, J.J., con-
curring); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968).
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968) where the Court granted taxpayers standing based on the satis-
ffiction of a two-pronged test: (1) a nexus between their status as taxpayers and the
challenged legislative enactment; and (2) a nexus between their taxpayer status and
specific constitutional restrictions. imposed on the taxing and spending power of Con-
gress. Id. The Court has since made clear, however, that it will limit the Flast holding to
suits based on "specific constitutional limitation[s] upon the ... taxing and spending
power [of Congress]." United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1975), quoting
Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 104.
65
 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); see United States v. Richard-
son, 418 U.S. 116, 178 (1974).
60
 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255.57 (1953); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S.
44, 46 (1943) (per curiam). A detailed discussion of this intricate area of law is beyond
the scope of this comment. The reader is referred to Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitu-
tional jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 626-60 (1962); Note, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 423. (1975).
67 Barrows V. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
68 Id. Indeed, the principle has been termed "a rule most often honored in the
breach." Note, supra note 66, at 443.
" See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Doctor-patient7° and teacher-pupil" relationships are two such exam-
ples. Other factors considered by the Court include the ability of
the third parties to assert their own rights, 72 and the possibility that
the rights of the third parties will be diluted if the plaintiffs are un-
able to assert those rights." These numerous exceptions to the "rule"
against asserting the rights of third parties evidence the Court's shift-
ing concept of its proper role. Where the concern for otherwise un-
assertable rights of third parties has outweighed the concern for
proper judicial restraint, the Court has not hesitated to subordinate its
concern for restraint and has allowed the plaintiffs to assert the third
party rights.
In statutory review cases, Congress, by explicitly authorizing the
courts to review the challenged governmental action, 74 has rendered
all but unnecessary the Court's concern for proper judicial restraint."
Thus the Court has been very liberal in recognizing the standing of
persons to sue under such acts once the plaintiffs establish that they
are within the class of persons authorized by the statute to bring
suit." In such cases, the Court generally has not denied standing to
72 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). In Tileston v. Ullman, 318
U.S. 44 (1943) a doctor was denied the right to assert the rights of his patients. The
reason for the denial of standing, however, appears to be that the doctor had failed to
satisfy the minimum Article III requirement of alleging injury to himself. Id. at 45. See
Note, supra note 66 at 430.
7 ' Brewer v. Ho'xie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2t1 91, 104-05 (8th Cir, 1956); cf.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
72 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972); N.A.A,C.P, v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 459 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953); United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (dictum).
73 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 481 (1964); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,22 (1960) (dictum).
Thus in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1952), the Court allowed the white
plaintiff to challenge the enforcement of a restrictive covenant preventing her from sell-
ing her land to a black buyer: "The relation between the coercion exerted on respon-
dent and her possible pecuniary loss thereby is so close to the purpose of the restrictive
covenant, to violate the constitutional rights of those discriminated against, that respon-
dent is the only effective adversary of the unworthy covenant in its last stand." Id. at
259.
74 See generally Scott, supra note 56, at 654-58. A typical provision allows any per-
son aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action to bring suit in the federal courts.
For example, Congress has decreed that "any ... person who is aggrieved or whose in-
terest is adversely affected" by an action by the Federal Communications Commission
may seek review in a federal court. 47 U.S.C, §402(b)(6) (1970). Some provisions, how-
ever, more narrowly define the class of persons who may bring suit. The Federal Trade
Commission Act provides review 1br; 'Any person ... required by an order of the
Commission to cease and desist .... " 15 U.S:C. § 45(c) (1970). The Federal Aviation
Act provides for "any person disclosing a substantial interest in [an] order." 49 U.S.C.
§ 1486(a) (1970). For other examples see Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Ac-
tion: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 429 n.12 (1974).
"Compare Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939)
(nonstatutory), with FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940)
(statutory). See Scott, supra note 56 at 656.
"See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972); id.
at 212 (White, Brennan & Powell, J. J., concurring); Scott, supra note 56, at 656.57
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plaintiffs asserting grievances shared by large segments of the
public.'?
The third group of cases are those which invoke the review pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge the actions of
federal agencies. Section 702 of the APA provides that la] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."" According to many com-
mentators, this provision did no more than restate the current law re-
garding.statutory and nonstatutory review; that is, unless the plaintiffs
were granted standing by a "relevant statute" they had to assert an in-
jury to a legal right as in nonstatutory review cases." Recent Supreme
Court opinions, however, have indicted otherwise.
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 8° the
Supreme Court devised a two part test for standing to challenge ad-
ministrative action under section 702 of the APA:" Plaintiffs must al-
n.43. A distinction must be drawn between a congressional grant of standing to "ag-
grieved persons" to challenge agency action and an attempt by Congress to authorize
someone to bring suit to determine the constitutionality of actions of the legislative or
executive branches of government. In the former situation the minimum constitutional
mandate of a "case" or "controversy" has been satisfied since the plaintiff is aggrieved,
i.e., injured in fact. In the latter situation there is no "case" or "controversy" but merely
an attempt to elicit an advisory opinion and hence the Court may not hear the case. See
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 363 (1910). See note 171 infra for a more detailed discussion.
"Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 1943). Justice Frankfur-
ter referred to persons vindicating generalized grievances felt by the public at large as
"private Attorney Generals [sic]," id. at 704, a phrase and concept which has been
widely utilized. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)
and cases cited therein.
" 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
" See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 844 (1955); L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADNIINISTRATIVE
ACTION 528-31 (1965); S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (1946) (remarks of
then Attorney General Clark); Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions,
75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 287-88 (1961); Scott, supra note 56, at 658-59.
" 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
HI Since the Data Processing opinion did not specifically refer to the APA during
its discussion of standing, some commentators have questioned whether the statute
played a significant role in the decision regarding standing. Scott, supra note 56, at 662
n.76. However, in a subsequent opinion, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972),
the Court made clear that in Data Processing plaintiffs' standing was based on the APA:
Early decisions under this statute interpreted the language as adopting the
various formulations of 'legal interest' and 'legal wrong' then prevailing as
constitutional requirements of standing. But, in Data Processing . . . we held
more broadly that persons had standing to obtain judicial review of federal
agency actions under § 10 of the APA where they had alleged that the
challenged action had caused them 'injury in fact,' and where alleged in-
jury was to an interest 'arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated' by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have
violated.
Id. at 733 (citations omitted).
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lege, first, that the challenged action caused them injury in fact, be it
economic or otherwise; 82
 and second, that the interest sought to be
protected is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 83
This second part of the test greatly liberalized the traditional re-
quirement of a violation of a specific legal interest formerly imposed
by the Court. Prior to Data Processing, plaintiffs had to assert that they
were members of the class of persons which the statute in question
was designed to protect." After Data Processing, plaintiffs could suc-
cessfully argue that in enacting the relevant statute, Congress was
arguably aware of their interests," or that, regardless of Congress' in-
tent, one of the effects of the statute was the protection of their
interests."
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has noted that it will re-
strict the more liberal "zone of interests" test to plaintiffs whose stand-
ing is based on the APA or on a specific statutory grant of review."
As a result, standing in APA cases has become very closely aligned
with standing in cases based on specific statutory review."" However,
plaintiffs challenging governmental action without relying on the APA
or a specific statutory grant of review still must meet the more tradi-
tional legal interest test."
In light of the foregoing discussion of standing it appears that
challengers of exclusionary zoning would be in a stronger position to
establish standing in the federal courts if they were to invoke either a
statute expressly providing for judicial review or the review provisions
of the APA than if they were to bring suit in a nonstatutory review
context. However, challengers cannot invoke specific statutory review
in the federal courts since zoning boards are local agencies and state
enabling acts cannot provide for review in federal courts. Thus, those
who wish to challenge exclusionary zoning in the federal courts are
limited to two avenues of attack. If they wish to directly challenge the
constitutionality of exclusionary zoning, they must proceed on non-
statutory review grounds and face formidable barriers to standing
arising out of jurisprudential concerns regarding generalized
" 1
 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152.
"Id. at 153.
"' Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. I, 7 (1968); see Scott, supra note 56, at
663; Note, 13 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 289, 297 (1971).
85
 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 . (1970) (per curiam).
" See Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-21, 634-38 (1971);
Note, supra note 84, at 302-04.
81
 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 n.I6
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 n.9 (1974).
88 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 n.9 (1974) in which the
Court indicated that in Data Processing (a case in which standing was based on the APA)
standing arose "under a specific statute .... In short, Congress had provided ... stand-
ing."
89 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 & n.16
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 & n.9 (1974).
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grievances." If they wish to indirectly challenge exclusionary
zoning—by attempting to block the receipt of federal funds by the
municipality because of the exclusionary zoning—then they may in-
voke the more liberal standing requirements of the APA, but must be
content with the limited relief such a challenge may afford."
II. CHALLENGES TO EXCLUSIONARY ZONING PRACTICES
A. A Direct Challenge: Warth v. Seldin
1. The Case
(a) Standing Formula
In Warth v. Seldin, 92
 plaintiffs attempted to challenge an
exclusionary zoning ordinance without the aid of an express statutory
grant of standing. Several organizations and individuals concerned
with the housing problems of the Rochester, New York metropolitan
area brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief and dam-
ages against both the Town of Penfield, a suburb adjacent to Roches-
ter, and against members of the town's Zoning, Planning, and Town
Boards.93
 Plaintiffs claimed that the town's zoning ordinance, by its
terms and as enforced, excluded people of low and moderate incomes
from living in Penfield, in violation of the First, Ninth, and Four-
teenth Amendments, as well as 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982, and
1983. 94
 Because the Court was presented with such a large variety of
plaintiffs, representing the interests of many of the diverse groups af-
fected by exclusionary zoning practices, Warth is a landmark case not
only as an indication of the Court's future role in addressing the
housing problems of low- and moderate-income citizens, but also for
its reassessment of the meaning of standing.
.	 The original plaintiffs in Warth included three low- or
moderate-income residents of Rochester; 95 one resident of a nearby
town who owned property in and paid taxes to Rochester, but who
was employed in Penfield;"" four residents of Rochester all of whom
owned property in and paid taxes to the city; and Metro-Act, Inc., a
not-for-profit corporation whose purpose was to "inquire into the
reasons for the critical housing shortages for low and middle income
persons in the Rochester area and to urge action ... to alleviate the
"See text and note at 60 supra.
" For a discussion of the limited nature of this relief, see text at notes 346-51
and 447-48 infra. It is possible, for example, that in such a challenge, a plaintiff's relief
may be restricted to a court order requiring the federal agency in question to institute
review procedures prior to making grants of federal funds.
"422 U.S. 490 (1975).
"M. at 493.
94 Id.
"Id. at 494.
" Id, at 495.
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general housing shortage for low and moderate income persons.""'
Both the low or moderate income residents of Rochester and the resi-
dent of the nearby town were members of ethnic or racial minority
groups." Two additional associations attempted to intervene or be
joined in the suit: Rochester Home Builders, an association of firms
involved in residential construction in the Rochester Metropolitan
area, and Monroe Area Housing Council, a not-for-profit corporation
comprised of several organizations interested in housing problems."
Plaintiffs challenged both specific terms of the zoning ordinance
as well as certain practices of the officials responsible for its
enforcement.'" The challenged terms of the zoning ordinance in-
cluded: (1) the allocation of 98 percent of the town's vacant land to
single-family detached housing; (2) the imposition of allegedly un-
reasonable requirements relating to lot size, set back, floor area, and
habitable space; and (3) the imposition of low-density and other re-
strictive requirements on the limited space allocated to multi-family
structures.'"' It was alleged that these factors made the construction
of low-cost housing economically unfeasible, and thus increased the
cost of housing built in Penfield beyond the financial means of per-
sons with low or moderate incomes.'"
The challenged practices of the town officials included: (1) de-
lays of action on proposals for low- and moderate-income housing; (2)
arbitrary denials of approval of such projects; (3) refusal to grant
necessary variances, permits, or tax abatements; (4) failure to provide
necessary support services for low- and moderate-cost housing de-
velopments; and (5) amendment of the zoning ordinance in a manner
making approval of low- and moderate-cost housing ,projects nearly
impossible.'" On the basis of these allegations, plaintiffs claimed that
members of Penfield's Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards had acted
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner in enforcing the
community's zoning ordinance.'" Plaintiffs also asserted that the ex-
clusion of such low-cost housing from Penfield had the effect of ex-
cluding members of racial and ethnic minorities from the town.' 05
The district court dismissed the entire suit, including Home
Builder's motion to intervene and the motion to join Monroe Area
Housing Council on the ground that none of the individual and as-
" 7 /d. at 494.
9 ' Id. at 494-95.
"" Id. at 497.
' 4 ° Id. at 493.
Id. at 495,
' 92 Id.
' 93 1d, at 495-96.
1 " Id. at 495.
'"' Id. at 496. Each group of plaintiffs, in addition, alleged certain specific harm
to themselves. Although these specific allegations are illustrative of the sweeping
breadth of the attack on Penfield's zoning practices, they will be discussed in the pre-
sentation of the Court's analysis of each plaintiff's standing.
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sociational plaintiffs had standing.'" The court of appeals
affirmed."' The Supreme Court, in turn, affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeals and held that the plaintiffs had not met the
standing requirements imposed either by Article III or by the juris-
prudential rules of judicial self-restraint.' 06
The Court first set forth general principles governing the de-
termination of standing. Its starting point was a characterization of
the standing issue as a question of "whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of the particular
issues."'" The majority then indicated that it viewed the standing in-
quiry as a dual question, involving both constitutional and juris-
prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction."° The Court
noted, however, that this traditional "dual" view of the standing doc-
trine was grounded in a concern for "the proper—and properly
limited—role of the courts in a democratic society," 111 suggesting at
the outset that standing, by definition, imported broad questions of
justiciability.' 12
The Court then stated that the threshold question in the stand-
ing inquiry is "whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case or con-
troversy' between himself and the defendant within the meaning of
Article III."'" As judicial power may be extended only to litigants
who have themselves suffered some injury resulting from an allegedly
illegal action, the Court noted that it was constitutionally required to
'°° 422 U.S. at 493. An additional ground for dismissal was the district court's
finding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Id.
'" 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
I" Worth, 422 U.S. at 517-18.
100 1d. at 498; see, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); P. BATOR. D.
SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 156 (2d ed. 1973).
110 The analysis of standing as a dual question involving both constitutional and
jurisprudential policy limitations is set forth in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
"' Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
112 /d. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Justice Brennan characterized jus-
ticiability as an inquiry which decides "whether the duty asserted can be judicially iden-
tified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right as-
serted can be judicially molded." Id. at 198. This inquiry has, according to previous au-
thorities, been one which remains separate from the narrower issue of standing. See,
e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), where the majority stated:
Millen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the
person whose standing is challenged is a proper, party to request an ad-
judication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable
.... The question whether a particular person is a proper party to main-
tain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers prob-
lems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other
branches of the Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all, only
from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated.
"3 Id. at 99-101. 422 U.S. at 498.
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determine whether the plaintiff had alleged "a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy to warrant his invocation of federal court
jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf."" 4
However, throughout the opinion, the Court indicated that a
simple allegation that the plaintiff had been harmed, or that a legally
protected interest had been invaded, would not in itself be sufficient
to meet Article III standing requirements. Rather, a plaintiff would
be required to demonstrate in the pleadings that the injury was
uniquely suited and appropriate for judicial resolution—that a rem-
edy fashioned by the Court would alleviate the injury alleged."s
The Court suggested that a plaintiff would be required to demon-
strate in the pleadings an injury which was shown to be personal,
palpable, and the necessary, direct result of the defendant's allegedly
illegal actions. The injury must also have been one that was immediate
and ripe for .judicial resolution.'"
fn addition to Article III concerns, the Court noted a second set
of questions which must be addressed in determining the type of liti-
gant who may invoke judicial power. This second category of ques-
tions involves matters of judicial self-governance." 7 More specifically,
prudential limitations developed by the Court restrict the exercise of
judicial power where the plaintiff raises abstract questions of broad
public significance (or generalized grievances) which may be more
appropriately addressed by other branches of government,'" or
where judicial intervention may be appropriate as to some unjoined
third party, but unnecessary to protect the plaintiffs individual
rights. 19 Thus, the court stated that it would require the plaintiff to
assert a personal, legally recognized interest in order to avoid applica-
tion of the prudential rules of judicial restraint.'"
"4 Id. at 498-99; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
" s Contra, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 171-73 (Brennan & White, J. J., con-
curring); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 450, 468, 472-73
(1970), where the view is expressed that the concept of standing simply requires an al-
legation of personal injury in fact. See also Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423
(1969); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152-53 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), where the standing determination is seen to turn on a
showing that a judicially cognizable interest has been invaded.
" Wart's, 422 U.S. at 501, 502, 504, 516.
"T Id. at 499.
"'Id. at 500. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 222 (1974); Ex pane Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Tyler v. Judges of the Court of
Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406 (1900).
"9 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255
(1953).
tu Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. The requirement of asserting a personal legal interest
is set forth in the opinion as a prudential limit which stands apart from the minimum
constitutional mandate of Article Ill. This distinction is recognized in the Court's
analysis of the standing of low income plaintiffs (see text at notes 131-38 infra) and the
Rochester Taxpayers (see text at notes 141-49, infra). However, this distinction becomes
blurred in the Court's treatment of Metro-Act's assertion of standing, where the legal
interest requirement is treated as an integral part of the meaning of Article III, See
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The Court pointed out that the nature and source of the
plaintiffs claim are crucial factors in determining whether a claim will
be barred by prudential rules of standing.' 2 ' Thus, in addition to de-
termining that Article III requirements have been met, the Court
must also focus upon the statutory or constitutional provision upon
which the plaintiff relies to determine whether such provision "can be
understood as granting persons in the plaintiffs position a right to
judicial relief. "122 If such provision can be so understood, then the
plaintiff is an appropriate litigant to invoke judicial power on his be-
half; he has alleged both an injury sufficient to meet Article III re-
quirements, and has shown that the injury alleged can be considered
an invasion of his legally protected interest. If the statutory or con-
stitutional provision on which the plaintiff relies cannot be so under- -
stood, then it necessarily follows that the plaintiff is either asserting a
"generalized grievance," 122 or is asserting rights other than his own.'"
As such, the party is barred by the prudential limitations on the juris-
diction of the Court.
The Court noted two exceptions to the jurisprudential rule of
self-restraint: (1) An express congressional grant of standing, even to
persons who would otherwise be barred by jurisprudential standing
text at notes 162-76 infra. Both views seem to have historical precedent: Compare Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (where the majority viewed Article III as encompassing
the question "whether the party ... has 'a personal stake in the outcome ... ' and
whether the dispute touches upon the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal
interests.'") (emphasis added), with United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 181
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (where the Court views "the controlling definition of the
irreducible Article III case-or-controversy requirements for standing" as the allegation
of a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy which will assure concrete ad-
verseness.) and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See also
United States v. Richardson, supra, at 196 n.18, where Justice Powell noted that "it
might be said that the correct reading of the Flast nexus test is a prudential limit, given
the Baker v. Carr definition of the constitutional bare minima." Accord, Construction
Indus. Assoc. of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 44 USLW 3467 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976). The latter view seems to be the soundest. If
the federal courts were limited by the constitution to cases "traditionally viewed as capable
of judicial resolution," then it would be constitutionally impermissible for them to rec-
ognize new legal interests created either by statute or by "broadening categories of judi-
cially cognizable injury." However, the Court has had no trouble recognizing legal in-
terests created by Congress, see FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473
(1940); Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-55 and has broadened categories of judicially
cognizable injury, see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Therefore, it must be inferred that the legal interest test is
more appropriately a question of application of prudential rules of self-restraint than
one of constitutional restrictions on federal court jurisdiction.
"' 422 U.S. at 500.
"1 1d.
113 A generalized grievance is found where the asserted injury is one that is felt
by all, and is not of the type to which the law provides a personal, individual remedy.
See, e.g., Sierra Club. v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
" 4 Third party standing problems arise where the injury alleged is one which the
law recognizes, but is one to which a remedy is afforded to persons other than those in
the position of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1953)
and test at notes 66-73 supra.
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rules, would be viewed as a clear mandate to the Court indicating
the propriety of judicial intervention;" 5 and (2) "countervailing
considerations""° may outweigh the concerns underlying judicial re-
straint where the litigant's claim rests on the rights of third parties. In
such instances, the Court would find "that the constitutional or statu-
tory provision in question implies a right of action in the plaintiff." 127
The Court then applied these general principles of the standing
doctrine to each individual and association involved in the suit. In
order to more fully understand the Court's analysis of the plaintiffs'
claims, it is important to note the use to which the majority put these
general principles. In its consideration of each of the plaintiffs allega-
tions, the Court adhered to these principles not merely as broad
guidelines, but as a concrete formula devised for the purpose of de-
termining standing. In order to establish himself as properly before
the court, a, plaintiff must:
(1) Allege a direct, palpable, immediate, and personal injury
which is sufficient to meet the requirements of Article III; 128 and
(2) either:
(a) show that the statute or constitutional provision upon which
he relies can be understood to grant him a right to judicial relief,
(b) show that Congress has expressly granted standing to per-
sons in his position, or
(c) show that countervailing considerations are present which
outweigh the general rule that a plaintiff may not rest a claim to relief
on the rights or interests of third parties.
Each claim presented in Warth was subjected to the criteria set
forth in this formula. Further, with each application of the formula,
the Court added layers of meaning to the individual elements within.
It is from this formula, as well as from the way it was applied to
• each type of plaintiff, that one may derive the Burger Court's view
of the structure and function of the standing doctrine.
(b) Individual Plaintiffs
In addition to the general allegations set forth above 128 the low-
and moderate-income plaintiffs also claimed that the town's zoning
practices, by preventing low- and moderate-income people from living
in Penfield, had forced them to live in less attractive environments."°
The Court accepted this allegation as true for the purposes of decid-
325 422 U.S. at 501. See text at notes 74-77 supra for a discussion of the effect of
a statutory grant of standing.
1 " 422 U.S. at 501-02. See text at notes 70-73 supra where such countervailing
considerations are set forth.
in 422 U.S. at 501.
1 " See text at notes 113-16 supra where the Court's definition of Article III in-
jury is set forth.
I  See text at notes 103-09 supra.
'a° 422 U.S. at 496.
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ing the standing issue. Nevertheless, the Court held that the allegation
was insufficient to meet Article III standing requirements,' 31 the first
criterion in the standing formula.
Two deficiencies in the allegations were noted by the Court.
First, the thrust of the plaintiffs' claim was that they were among the
class of persons excluded by Penfield's zoning practices.' 32 The fact
that the plaintiffs were part of this group did not convince the Court
that they were personally injured by the challenged zoning practices. In
order to establish the first requirement of standing Ipletitioners must
allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that in-
jury has been suffered by other unidentified members of the class to
which they belong and which they purport to represent." 133
Second, the plaintiffs failed to show that their inability to locate
suitable housing in Penfield necessarily or directly resulted from the
actions of the respondents. The Court was not certain from the alle-
Fations that "absent the respondent's restrictive zoning practices, there
is a substantial probability that [these plaintiffs] would have been able
to purchase or lease in Penfield and that if the court affords the relief
requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed."'"
The majority pointed out that other factors, such as economics of the
housing market in the area, may have been equally responsible for
plaintiffs' alleged injury.'" Since the Court remained uncertain that
the plaintiffs could "benefit in a tangible way from the courts'
intervertion," 1 " it did not allow the plaintiffs a hearing on the merits.
In order for these plaintiffs to have met the minimum requirements
of standing under Article III they would not only have had to allege
' 3 ' Id. at 502-05.
' 33 Id. at 502.
' 33 Id.; cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972) where Justice
Stewart noted that the requirement of individualized injury serves as at least a rough
attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those
who have a direct stake in the outcome." Compare Worth, 422 U.S. at 502, with Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where the majority found that the plaintiffs had alleged an
injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Article III. "If [the alleged impairment of
plaintiffs' votes] does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among those who
have sustained it." (emphasis added). Id. at 204.
13 ' 422 U.S. at 504. Compare id., with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where
the Court approached the question of the efficacy of judicial relief in this manner: "It
would not be necessary to decide whether appellants' allegations of impairment of their
votes by the 1901 apportionment will, ultimately, entitle them to any relief in order to
hold that they have standing to seek it."/d. at 204.
' 3 ' 422 U.S. at 506; cf. M. BROOKS, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 7 (ASPO Planning Ad-
visory Serv. Rep. No. 254, 1970). It is reasonable to decide that such factors are beyond
the scope of judicial management. However, the Court failed to recognize that many
exclusionary zoning practices directly affect the economics of the area housing market
by affecting the cost of construction. See 422 U.S. at 506; M. BROOKS, supra, at 7-9;
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN
PROBLEMS TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 422-24 (1968);
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 31-33
(1974).
136 422 U.S. at 508.
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that they suffered some personal injury but they also would have
had to demonstrate in their pleadings a direct causal relationship be-
tween their injury and the respondents' actions.' 37 Because their
allegations failed on both scores, the claims of the low- and moderate-
income plaintiffs were dismissed.
The Court thus indicated that even in determining the minimum
constitutional requirements of standing, it was fundamentally con-
cerned not simply with the existence of truly adverse parties, but with
the amenability of the issue to judicial resolution as we ll. In prior deci-
sions, these concerns were thought to be questions not of standing,
but of justiciability, and were to be addressed when considering the
merits of the claim.'"
The Court next considered the standing of those plaintiffs who
sued on the basis of their status as taxpayers of Rochester. Their
claim asserted that as a result of Penfield's exclusionary zoning prac-
tices, "the city of Rochester had been forced to impose a higher tax
rate on its citizens than would otherwise have been necessary."'" In
essence, since Penfield refused to allow construction of low- and
moderate-cost housing, Rochester was forced to do so. To provide
such housing, however, it was necessary for Rochester to allow certain
tax abatements; and "as the amount of tax-abated property
increase[d], Rochester taxpayers [were] forced to assume an increased
tax burden in order to finance essential public services."'"
According to the majority, this claim of economic injury result-
ing from Penfield's zoning practices also fell short of meeting the
minimum requirements of Article III. First, the existence of an injury
'" Id. at 507. The concern that there be a direct causal relationship between the
defendants' actions and the injury asserted has appeared in previous cases considering
the standing doctrine. In Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969), for example, the
Court granted standing to a labor union member challenging the constitutionality of a
state statute which created a commission to investigate possible criminal conduct in
labor-management relations. Id. at 414, 425. The Court stated that "[t]he decisions of
this Court have also made it clear that something more than an 'adversary interest' is
necessary to confer standing. There must in addition be some connection between the
official action challenged and some legally protected interest of the party challenging
that action." Id. at 423. The Court found that the plaintiff possessed a sufficient adver-
sary interest, stating; "We are not presented with a case in which any injury to appellant
is merely a collateral consequence .... "Id. at 424.
In Jenkins, the allegations were read broadly in light of Fan. R. Civ. P. 8 (f), pro-
viding that a complaint is to be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. In Jenkins
the Court concluded that the mere allegation of a direct causal relationship was suffi-
cient. Id. at 425. In Worth, however, plaintiffs were required to state in their pleadings
facts from which the Court could infer a direct causal relationship. 422 U.S. at 504. As
Justice Brennan argued in his dissenting opinion, this view seems to require the party
to prove his case on paper before he can get into court. Citing Jenkins, Justice Brennan
pointed out that "this Court has not required such unachievable specificity in standing
cases in the past." Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"8 See note 112 supra. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 171-73 (Brennan,
J., & White, J., concurring).
'a° 422 U.S. at 496.
"° Id. at 508-09.
367
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to this group was considered "conjectural."'" Even assuming that an
injury did exist, the Court concluded that "the line of causation be-
tween Penfield's actions and such injury [to Rochester taxpayers] is not
apparent from the complaint. "14 2 Rather, the alleged injury—higher
taxes—resulted only from decisions made by Rochester authorities
who were not parties to this case.' 43
The Court further noted that even if the taxpayers had met the
Article III requirements for standing, their claim would still have
been barred by the prudential rules. In its analysis, the Court meas-
ured the taxpayer's claim against each criterion in its standing for-
mula and concluded that none of the possible elements barring the
application of jurisprudential rules was present.'"
Looking to the nature and source of the taxpayers' claim, the
Court found that these plaintiffs had not asserted any personal right,
either statutory or constitutional, to be free from actions of an adja-
cent suburb, even where those actions have possible adverse effects on
the city in which they reside.' 45
 Finding no legally protected interest,
the Court concluded that the taxpayers' complaint either expressed a
general rather than a personal grievance, or asserted the legal in-
terests of third parties.' 46
 The Court determined that the latter ap-
plied: the plaintiffs had based their claim not on their own rights as
taxpayers, but on the rights of those who had been excluded from
Penfield by its exclusionary zoning practices. 147 The Court found
none of the countervailing .considerations which would otherwise out-
weigh the usual reluctance to adjudicate claims based on the rights of
third parties. The only relationship that the Court could find between
the taxpayers and those excluded from Penfield was a coincidental
"congruity of interest." 146 Such a "tenuous" relationship was insuffi-
141 Id. at 309 The fact that the Court treats the claim of injury to the taxpayers
as "conjectural" could mean one of' two things: either (I) the Court was not satisfied
that the plaintiffs alleged that their taxes had increased at all, or that their tax rates
were disproportionately high—basically a question of improper or insufficient pleading;
or (2) the Court is turning away from Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (individual
taxpayer was granted standing) and returning to Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923) (individual taxpayer claim was barred because, inter alia, the injury was "com-
paratively minute ... remote, fluctuating and uncertain.") 422 U.S. at 487. The Court
in Worth cited to United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973), where the Court's concern was not with the amount, but with the
personal nature of the injury. Id. at 684-85. Thus, the inference may be drawn that the
Court's analysis of the" Rochestertaxpayer's claim is based on the first rationale.
However, the question is not squarely resolved in the opinion.
' 42
 Worth, 422 U.S. at 509.
143
 Id.
144 1d. at 509-10.
145 Id. at 509.
I"
 See text at note 128 supra, where the Court's overall framework in assessing
standing of each party is set forth.
'" 422 U.S. at 509.
148 Id. at 510.
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cient to bring the taxpayers within the exception to the rule barring
third party claims.'"
(c) Associational Plaintiffs
In considering the claims of the three associational plaintiffs,
Metro-Act, Home Builders, and Monroe Area Housing Council, the
Court. significantly expanded its definition of Article III standing re-
quirements by suggesting that these requirements include factors of
immediacy, ripeness,' 5 " and presence of a legal interest (a factor
which was previously considered by the Court to be a jurisprudential
requirement).' 51
 The Court also made major departures from the
reasoning of previous exclusionary zoning cases where plaintiffs were
granted standing due in part to the willingness of the lower federal
courts both to allow builders and developers to raise the rights of
third parties,'" and to recognize a connection between a claim of
wealth discrimination and a claim of race discrimination.'"
Before treating the specific claims raised by the three associa-
tional plaintiffs, the Court reviewed the circumstances under which
associations generally have standing. The majority pointed out that an
association itself may have standing where there is an injury to or an
interference with the association's own rights.'" In such cases the as-
sociation may also assert the rights of its members, as long as the chal-
lenged violations adversely affect the members' "associational ties."'"
In the absence of an injury to itself, an association may have
standing solely as the representative of its members.'" Under these
"" See discussion of the assertion of third-party rights by Metro-Act in text at
notes 201-209 infra.
"" See 422 U.S. at 516 and discussion of Home Builders' and Housing Council's
claim at notes 210-220 infra.
I a I See 422 U.S. at 513, and discussion of Metro-Act's claim at notes 163-176
infra.
142 See Metropolitan Housing Dcv. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975). Park View
Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir. 1972); Sisters of
Providence of Saint Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. 111.
1971).
153 See cases cited at note 152 supra. See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City
of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2(1 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
'" 422 U.S. at 511. Several exclusionary zoning cases illustrate this point. See,
e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897
(9111 Cir. 1975);cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976); Park View Heights
Corp. v, City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1010 (1971).
"a N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958); see United States v. Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), where standing
was granted to an environmental group alleging that a particular measure promulgated
by the Interstate Commerce Commission caused their members "economic, recreational,
and aesthetic harm." Id. at 678.
1 " National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246, 247
(f 963).
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circumstances, however, additional factors must be established before
the Court will apply its standing formula as set forth above. Here, the
Article III requirement of an injury in fact will be met only where
the association can allege that its members are suffering such im-
mediate or imminent injury as would be sufficient to establish stand-
ing had they themselves brought suit.' 57 The Court further indicated
that representational standing is appropriate only where the relief
sought "does not make the individual participation of each injured
party indispensable to the proper resolution of the cause .... "158
Thus, where the association asserts standing as a representative of its
members, it must take care to seek a remedy that will inure to thé be-
nefit of those members actually injured.'"
The Court then applied these principles to Metro-Act which
claimed: (1) injury to itself as a Rochester taxpayer; (2) injury to its
members who were Rochester taxpayers and persons of moderate or
low income; and (3) injury to its members who were Penfield resi-
dents, on whose behalf Metro-Act alleged deprivation of the benefits
of living in an integrated community.'" The assertions of injury to
Metro-Act itself and to its members as Rochester taxpayers were held
to be insufficient to establish Article III injury."' These claims were
dismissed because the allegations failed to show a personal, palpable
injury directly caused by the actions of the defendants, the same
reasons which had been applied to the allegations of the individual
plaintiffs.'" The Court then turned to Metro-Act's claim that the ex-
clusionary zoning practices deprived Penfield residents of the benefits
of living in an integrated community. In its treatment of this claim,
the Court made its most significant departures from previous zoning
cases, and applied its own criteria of standing in a most questionable
manner.
Metro-Act specifically relied on Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co.'" as authority to establish an immediate or foreseeable in-
jury to Penfield residents. In Trafficante, the Court granted standing
to tenants who had filed a complaint with the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) pursuant to section 810(a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. 164 The tenants alleged racial discrimination
in apartment rentals, in violation of the Act. After HUD failed to sec-
ure from the landlord voluntary compliance with the Act, the plain-
tiffs brought an action in the district court alleging lost social, business
'" Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
in Warth, 422 U.S. at 511.
an Id. at 515; see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States,
372 U.S. 246, 247 (1963).
166 422 U.S. at 512.
' 6 ' Id. at 513.
' 66 See discussion of Rochester taxpayer standing in text at notes 139-49 supra.
1e3 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
' 6 ' 42 U.S.C. 3601 (1970).
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and professional benefits of living in an integrated community and
embarrassment and economic damage from being stigmatized as resi-
dents of a "white ghetto."' 65
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing'" and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.'" However, the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the plaintiffs had alleged a particular individual
injury sufficient to meet Article III requirements, and to demonstrate
that the suit was brought in an adversarial context.'" Further, the
Court found that the Act upon which the plaintiffs relied was broad
and inclusive, depending upon private suits as its primary method of
enforcement. 18 " Therefore, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs
had demonstrated the existence of a personal legal right sufficient to
allay the Court's jurisprudential concerns.
The concurring opinion, however, took the position that absent
the Civil Rights Act, which authorized suits by persons in the position
of these plaintiffs, the tenants would have had great difficulty in es-
tablishing a case or controversy under Article III.'" The important
difference in the two opinions was the differing views on the signifi-
cance of the statute involved. The majority found the existence of an
injury sufficient to meet Article III requirements independent of the
statute. According to the majority, the statute satisfied not the con-
stitutional, but the jurisprudential requirement that there be a per-
sonal legal interest at the core of the complaint. The concurring opin-
ion, on the other hand, indicated that a finding of injury which would
meet constitutional requirements was wholly dependent upon the exis-
tence of the statute. Thus, the concurring Justices in Trafficante
recognized a power in Congress to "create" an injury in fact by creat-
ing legal interests, the denial of which would confer standing. 17 '
"5 409 U.S. at 208.
"6 322 F: Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
181 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
"" 409 U.S. at 208.
"5 1d. at 209, 211.
"° Id. at 212 (White, J., joined by Blackmun & Powell, Jj., concurring).
171 This recognition raises serious constitutional questions as to the appropriate
role of Congressional power within the realm of Article III. The Court makes an im-
portant distinction in this regard: In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), the
Court noted that "Mt is of course true that 'Congress may not confer jurisdiction on
Art. III federal courts to render advisory opinions' ... But Congress may enact statutes
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury
would exist without the statute." Id. at 617 n.3. Such a distinction is crucial, for an at-
tempt on the part of Congress to create cases or controversies where none would
otherwise exist has been seen to be inimical to the proper exercise of the judicial func-
tion. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864), where Chief Justice
Taney stated,
Congress cannot extend the appellate power of this Court beyond the
limits prescribed by the Constitution, and can neither confer nor impose
on it the authority or duty of hearing and determining an appeal ... nor
can Congress authorize or require this Court to express an opinion on a
rase where its judicial power could not be exercised
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The Court in Warth did not follow the Trafficante majority's in-
dication that the type of injury alleged by the plaintiffs was in itself
sufficient to meet Article III requirements independent of the existence
of the statute. Rather, it followed the concurring opinion in
Trafficante, and found that Metro-Act's alleged injury alone, without
the aid of the statutory grant of standing, was insufficient to meet Ar-
ticle III requirements.' 72 Because Metro-Act had not relied on the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 as had the Trafficante plaintiffs, the Court was
unwilling to conclude that it had suffered a "judicially cognizable
injury.""a
It is submitted that the Court's reasoning in reaching this con-
clusion is both questionable in terms of its adherence to its standing
formula previously set forth,'" and troubling in its suggestion as to
the way in which Article III injury is defined.' 75 In determining the
existence of an injury in fact, the Court went beyond considering
whether there was a personal, palpable injury directly caused by de-
fendants' actions. It looked, in addition, to the nature and source of
the plaintiffs claim. As such, the Court found that the lack of a
statutory grant of standing was determinative not of whether the
party had asserted a personal legal interest, but rather, of whether the
party had been injured at all. "8
See also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), where the Court refused to hear
a case brought pursuant to a statute authorizing a suit to test the validity of previous
legislation concerning the property rights of the Cherokee Nation. The Court held:
"[Me think the Congress ... exceeded the limitations of legislative authority, so far as
it required of this court action not judicial in its nature within the meaning of the Con-
stitution." Id. at 362. In Muskrat, the ultimate determination of the sort of issue which
was -judicial in nature" remained not with Congress, but with the Court. The Court in-
dicated that the alternative would be that
this court, instead of keeping within the limits of judicial power, and de-
ciding cases and controversies arising between opposing parties, as the
Constitution intended it should, will be required to give opinions in the
nature of advice concerning legislative action—a function never conferred
upon it by the Constitution, and against the exercise of which the court
has steadily set its face from the beginning.
Id. Accord, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972):
Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. III federal courts to render
advisory opinion ... or to entertain "friendly suits" ... or to resolve
"political questions" ... because suits of this character are inconsistent with
the judicial function under Art. Ill. But where a dispute is otherwise jus-
ticiable, the question whether the litigant is a "proper party to request an
adjudication of a particular issue" ... is one within the power of Congress
to determine ....
Id. 723 n.3. The distinction asserted in Linda R.S. is not without problems, however.
These problems are discussed in the text infra at notes 179-183.
'" 422 U.S. at 513-14.
'"Id. at 514.
"'See text at note 128 supra.
175 See note 171 supra.
'" 422 U.S. at 513-14.
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In considering the nature and source of the plaintiff's claim as a
crucial factor in establishing an injury sufficient to meet the minimum
requirements of Article III, the Court incorporated into its definition
of Article III standing requirements certain aspects of the prudential
considerations which it had been so careful to separate in its previous
general analysis. 177 Had the Court faithfully applied this analysis,
which defined Article III requirements of personal injury as distinct
from the jurisprudential inquiry into the source of the plaintiff's
claim, and had the Court followed the majority opinion in Trafficante
indicating that such an injury was sufficient in itself to meet Article
III standing requirements, it could have found that Metro-Act had al-
leged an injury in fact within the meaning of Article III.
The necessity of relying on a statute to establish the existence of
an injury within the meaning of Article III is troubling. It is possible
that the Court was merely analyzing the Metro-Act nonstatutory
claim, as compared to the Trafficante statutory claim, as follows: (I)
Congress may create rights which only exist by statute; (2) a denial of
these rights may result in an injury sufficient to meet the require-
ments of Article III; 178
 (3) therefore, where no legal right exists, and
where none has been created by statute, there can be no invasion of
a legal right, and hence, no injury. This analysis is consistent with a
statement made in the opinion that "the actual or threatened injury
required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing .... ' "I" This
analysis is also consistent with Justice Frankfurter's view set forth
earlier,"" in which Article III standing was determined by the exis-
tence both of an injury in fact and of a legal interest.
Yet the Court in Warth carefully separated considerations of in-
jury in fact from those of legal interest. "Injury in fact," the minimum
constitutional requirement of Article III, was characterized by the
Court as involving the question of adverseness, " 'whether the plaintiff
has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'
to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify the
exercise of the court's remedial power on his behalf."'" As assurance
of this constitutionally mandated adverseness, the Court has required
plaintiffs to allege an injury which is palpable, personal, and direct.
The existence of a legal interest, on the other hand, was characterized
as part of the jurisprudential component of standing, a separate and
distinct element of the doctrine. Even where plaintiffs could point to a
statute that expressly granted them a right of action, the Court in-
sisted that the Article III requirement of adverseness remained." 2
"'See text at notes 113-128 supra where the Court's two-part standing analysis is
set forth.
' 7 ' Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
In Mirth, 422 U.S. at 500, citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 4W U.S. 614, 617 n.3
(1973). See note 171 supra.
l' 5 See note 115 supra and text at note 240 infra.
181 422 U.S. at 498-99.
1 " Warth. 422 U.S. at 501.
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In this context, a reliance on a statute to "create" injury in fact
within the meaning of Article III suggests a willingness on the part of
the Court to cede to Congress the power to create "adverseness"
where it would not otherwise exist. As was pointed out earlier, this re-
sult has been consistently viewed as inimical to the proper exercise of
the judicial function.' 83
The Court further stated that even if Metro-Act had met the Ar-
ticle III requirement of a personal injury, its claim would still have
been barred by the prudential rules.'" It rejected' 85
 the argument set
forth in an amicus brief that Metro-Act's complaint stated colorable
claims under section 3610 and section 3604 of the Civil Rights Act of
1968. 186
 The Court refused to apply these statutes, which focus on ra-
cial discrimination, to a complaint which stated that the zoning prac-
tices in question have only the effect of excluding persons of low and
moderate income, thereby excluding members of racial or ethnic
minorities.' 87
 The Court distinguished this type of allegation from a
complaint directly alleging purposeful racial or ethnic discrimination.' 88
Finding no other statute which created personal rights in the
plaintiff, and finding no constitutional provision affording it a per-
sonal right of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Court con-
cluded that Metro-Act's claim on behalf of Penfield residents was an
attempt to assert the rights of third parties. 1 e" As "none of the excep-
tions that allow such claims is present here,"'" Metro-Act's assertions
of standing were, in the Court's view, barred by rules of judicial
self-restraint.' 9 I
The Court's analysis is significant in two respects. First, the
Court was unwilling to treat an allegation of purposeful exclusion of
low-income residents, with the effect of excluding racial and ethnic
minorities, as stating a claim of race discrimination within the purview
of various civil rights statutes. In so ruling, it severely restricted the
types of challenges to exclusionary zoning which had previously been
recognized as appropriate by the lower courts.
Several circuits have applied a race discrimination analysis to
complaints alleging that zoning practices exclude low-income persons,
and thereby maintain a pattern and practice of racial segregation. For
example, the Eighth Circuit in Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black
' 8 ' See note 171 supra.
"4
 422 U.S. at 514.
183 /d. at 513 n.2I
u" Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law as Amicus Curiae at
— cited in Wank 422 U.S. at 513 n.21. The statutes cited were 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610
(a), 3608 (a), (b) (1970).
187 422 U.S. at 513, n.21.
'" Id.
'" Id. at 514.
'" Id.
u" Id.
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jack 292 treated a elairn 193 that the city's zoning practices had the pur-
pose and effect of excluding moderate and lower income persons, in-
cluding blacks, as properly stating a claim under various statutes and
constitutional provisions traditionally applied only to discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin.'" This approach was
adopted in the Second Circuit in Kennedy Park Homes v. City of
Lackawanna, 185 by the Fifth Circuit in Metropolitan Development Corpora-
. tion v. City of Arlington Heightsm and by the district court in Sisters of
Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston.'" The willing-
ness of the lower courts to treat allegations of economic discrimination
as essentially stating claims of race discrimination is appropriate for
two reasons: (1) factually, economic discrimination has a dispropor-
tionate effect on blacks;'" and (2) the plaintiffs in these actions face
unique problems of proof. Where a pattern and practice of racial dis-
19: 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
"Id. at 1211.
" 94 /d. at 1212.
193 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). in Kennedy
Park Homes, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant city and city officials had deliberately
rezoned property which the plaintiffs had selected for a housing project, in order to
deny decent housing to low income and minority families. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the alleged conduct not only in its immediate effect, but also in its
historical context and ultimate effect. Id, at 113. The court considered evidence of
housing patterns in the city as well as the atmosphere in which the parties acted, con-
cluding that "racial motivation resulting in invidious discrimination" guided the actions
of the defendants, id. at 109, and that the effect of the city's action was "inescapably ad-
verse" to the enjoyment of the constitutional right to be free from discrimination in the
exercise of property rights. Id. at 114.
As an indication of the extent to which the Kennedy court considered the analysis
of race discrimination appropriate, it should be noted that it viewed the case as one
similar to Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), where the Supreme Court struck
down a zoning ordinance which explicitly required racial segregation within the city, id.
at 82. Kennedy, 436 F.2d at 115.
1 'e 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 4,
1975). In Arlington, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the town's zoning practices had the
effect of perpetuating segregation through its housing patterns. This was found suffi-
cient to state a claim of race discrimination invoking strict judicial scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 912-13.
335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971). In Sisters of Providence, plaintiffs alleged that
current zoning practices made it economically unfeasible to build low-cost housing.
Claiming that there was an urgent need for such housing in the city, and that black
persons represented a substantial percentage of residents suffering from inadequate
housing, the plaintiffs alleged that the challenged zoning practice had the effect of per-
petuating racial segregation. Following Kennedy Park Homes, the district court indicated
that a showing of the segregative effect of a zoning practice could be probative of' a pur-
poseful intent to discriminate. Id. at 404. The court held that "plaintiff's allegations that
'Black persons ... represent a substantial percentage of residents of Evanston who have
low and moderate incomes' ... is sufficient to bring this case into the realm of racial
rather than economic discrimination." Id. at 403. Thus, for the purposes of standing,
the court concluded that it was appropriate to "treat the allegations as those of racial
discrimination, with 'economic feasibility' as a secondary factor in the factual basis of
the Complaint." Id.
1°e
	
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
SUBURBIA 7 (1974).
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crimination is involved,"° a requirement that plaintiffs prove that the
challenged actions were the result of an illegal motive has been
considered unrealistic. 200
On the basis of these previous zoning challenges, the Supreme
Court in Warth could have viewed the exclusion of moderate- and
low-income persons as having a racially discriminatory effect which
maintained a pattern of racial segregation. Thus, Metro-Act's claim
could have been brought within the purview of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 for the purposes of standing. Had the Court recognized that the
claim did fall within the Act, it would not have been concerned with
the questions of prudential self-restraint, as the statute would have
conferred the requisite personal legal interest in the plaintiffs.
The second significant aspect of the Court's analysis with re-
gard to prudential limitations involves the Court's refusal to allow
Metro-Act to assert the rights of third parties. Had the Court adopted
the reasoning used in either of two previous lower court exclusionary
zoning cases, it could have permitted the assertion of third party
rights. The approach taken by the district court in Sisters of Providence
was to grant all the plaintiffs standing, subject to the condition that if
it were established at a later stage that the rights in issue were suffi-
ciently represented by some of the plaintiffs, other unnecessary plain-
tiffs would be dismissed."' Following this approach, a community or-
ganization was granted standing to represent the interests of minority
groups excluded by a challenged zoning ordinance. Their grant of
standing, however, was conditioned upon a showing at the trial that
"there is a compelling need to grant them standing in order that con-
stitutional rights of persons not immediately before the court might
be vindicated." 202 The Court in Warth did not even consider this ap-
proach of a conditional grant of standing, but instead applied its own
formula—unconditional in this regard—and, not finding any of the
exceptions which would allow the assertion of third party rights, it
denied Metro-Act standing.
A third approach was applied in Black Jack, where two non-
profit corporations were granted standing to question whether the
purpose and effect of a particular zoning ordinance was to exclude
low- and moderate-income people from the city."' The court held that
the associations had a right to raise constitutional claims of the ex-
cluded individuals because the interests of the corporate and indi-
vidual plaintiffs—a desire to be free from discriminatory zoning prac-
tices --- were "sufficiently close." 204
'°° The situation in which a plaintiff challenges a pattern and practice rather
than a specific action is described by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Warth.
422 U.S. at 522-23.
2°° See Warth, 422 U.S. at 527-28, 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
2°' 335 F. Supp. at 400.
2 ° 2 1d. at 401, quoting Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920,
937 (2d Cir. 1968).
205 1d. at 1212-13.
204 Id. at 1213.
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The Court in Warth, however, did not allow Metro-Act to assert
the rights of excluded potential residents of Penfield. It found that
there was "no relationship other than an incidental congruity of in-
terests" between the members of Metro-Act who were Rochester tax-
payers and the excluded potential residents of Penfield. 2" Similarly,
those Metro-Act members who were Penfield residents and were
claiming a denial of the benefits of living in an integrated community
could not assert the rights of excluded minorities where "no contrac-
tual or other relationship" was involved.'"
The Supreme Court's apparent failure to sanction the "suffi-
ciently close" interest test used in Black Jack seemingly restricts the
circumstances under which one may assert third party rights. Black
Jack, however, is distinguishable from Warth in several important re-
spects. The plaintiffs in Black jack were sponsors of a building project,
ready and willing to construct low-cost housing. Specific viable pro-
jects were thus involved. 2" Therefore the court knew that once it
granted the plaintiffs the remedy they sought—invalidation of the
zoning ordinances—plaintiffs would then proceed to construct the
housing. The third party low-income non-residents whose rights were
being asserted would thus be afforded relief. 208 In contrast, if the
Court in Warth declared the Penfield zoning actions unconstitutional,
it had no assurance that the third party's injury would be alleviated,
since there was no specific project being thwarted by the present zon-
ing. The Metro-Act plaintiffs, not being builders or contractors, were
not parties who would be instrumental in alleviating the injury of
those excluded. Thus, the Court in Warth may not have rejected the
"sufficiently close" interest test of Black jack. It simply may have had a
reasonable factual basis for its refusal to allow an "incidental" con-
gruity of interests to suffice for the assertion of third party non-
resident rights by Metro-Act and Penfield residents.
Further, although the court in Black Jack indicated that a con-
gruity of interests alone would be a sufficient condition to allow the
assertion of third party rights, the authority upon which it relied was
merely dictum in cases in which a significant relationship was
involved. 209 At most, then, the Court was merely departing from dic-
tum in cases distinguishable on their facts from Warth. It indicated
only that exclusionary zoning cases will be considered according to the
2 " 422 U.S. at 510.
205 Id. at 514 n.22. Arguably, the congruity of interests in the latter situation was
far greater than "incidental."
2°7 467 F.2d at 1210.
2 " The court in Black jack relied on Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238
F.2d 91, 104 (8th Cir. 1956) as precedent for allowing a congruity of interest to suffice
for the ability to assert third party rights. Black jack, 467 F.2d at 1213. In Brewer, the
plaintiffs (school board), if granted the remedy requested, would have been instrumen-
tal in affording relief to the third parties (students) whose rights were asserted. See
Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No..46, supra, at 105.
2" Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956) (school
hoard—pupils); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (vendor of property—vendee).
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same standard as other standing cases in which the parties attempt to
raise the rights of third parties, despite the apparent loosening of
such standards in some lower court decisions.
The Court next examined the standing of Home Builders, the
second associational plaintiff. In doing so the Court introduced two
new factors into its standing analysis: (1) a requirement of a precise
relationship between the amount of the damages claimed and the in-
jury alleged; and (2) a requirement that the representative association
claim an injury to its members which is immediate and ripe for judicial
consideration.
Home Builders claimed that Penfield's zoning practices "arbitrar-
ily and capriciously had prevented member firms from building low-
and moderate-cost housing in Penfield, and thereby had deprived
them of potential profits." 2 " As a representative of member firms in-
volved in the development of residential housing in the Rochester
area, Home Builders sought both damages and injunctive and de-
claratory relief. 2 " Before applying its standing formula the Court first
examined the plaintiffs claim for damages, noting that "whether an
association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on be-
half of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of
the relief sought. '1212 Any injury that may have been suffered by the
association could only be that which was representative of economic
harm felt by particular individual members. Therefore, the Court
found that the damages claimed by Home Builders was not represen-
tative of an injury which was shared equally among the entire
membership. 2 " As such, the claim for damages required "indi-
vidualized proof."2 " Under these circumstances, the Court found that
in order to obtain damages, each individual member of the association
claiming injury as a result of Penfield's exclusionary zoning practices
had to be a party to the suit. As a representative association, Home
Builders .was found not to have standing to claim these damages on
behalf of its members. 2 t 5
Thus it is apparent from the Court's analysis that a determina-
tion of representational standing turns, in part, on the type of relief
sought. The association asserting standing on behalf of its members is
not considered an appropriate litigant where the remedy sought could
not at the outset reasonably be expected to benefit those parties actu-
ually injured. 2 " This ruling is consistent with the Court's concern that
the remedy must be no broader than that which is necessary to al-
leviate the harm alleged. 217 However, as a practical matter, the ruling
"° 422 U.S. at 497.
" Id. at 515.
Id.
"3 1d.
" 1 1d. at 515-16.
" Id.
Id. at 515.
"' Id. at 508.
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suggests a very strict approach to the plaintiffs' complaint: where the
court scrutinizes the amount of the damage claim at the pleading
stage, it requires of the plaintiff an extreme degree of precision and
specificity in drafting the complaint.
Unlike the damages claim, however, Home Builders' claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief could, according to the Court, inure
to the benefit of all individual members of Home Builders Associa-
tion. Therefore, the Court proceeded to an examination of whether
Article Ill requirements had been satisfied. The Court held that these
requirements had not been met." In examining the allegations, it
found no showing that any of the individual members had been pre-
cluded from commencing any current housing project due to the ex-
clusionary zoning practices of the town. As such, the members suf-
fered no injury of "sufficient immediacy and ripeness to warrant judi-
cial intervention."2 " Applying the rule that an association can have
standing to represent its members only where it alleges facts sufficient
to establish a case or controversy had the individuals themselves
brought suit, the Court denied Home Builders standing."°
This holding is susceptible to two possible interpretations. Read
narrowly, the denial of standing to this plaintiff is consistent with the
Court's general analysis of representational standing. As representa-
tional standing is derived from the ability of the represented indi-
viduals to bring suit, a representative association may not assert stand-
ing on behalf of its members unless the members themselves could
demonstrate the existence of a case or controversy. Thus, to the ex-
tent that mootness, ripeness, or standing considerations enter into the
determination of "a case or controversy," they will also be determina-
tive of representational standing. This view of the Court's ruling sim-
ply states a guideline for determining representational standing. It
does not affect the definition or essential nature of the minimum in-
jury which is required by Article III..
Read more broadly, however, the ruling imports questions of
ripeness into Article Ill standing requirements, thereby adding a new
element to the constitutional definition of "injury." The injury of
which the litigant complains must not only be palpable and personal.
It must not only be the direct and necessary result of the actions of
the respondents. It must also be immediate and ripe for judicial con-
sideration. if this requirement had arisen purely as a ripeness consid-
eration, as distinct from a standing consideration, the Court could
have dismissed the complaint solely on ripeness grounds. However,
the Court held that the plaintiff had not met standing
requirements," suggesting that the timing of the claim is an impor-
tant factor in the standing determination. In so ruling, the Court
seems to be utilizing the concept of standing as one which represents
11 ' 422 U.S. at 516.
112 /d.
11" Id.
"' Id.
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Article III concerns in general; rather than being treated as a doc-
trine conceptually distinct from other Article III questions of ripeness,
mootness, and justiciability, standing is viewed as a set of rules which
subsume all of these concerns as "threshold determinants of the pro-
priety of judicial intervention. "222
The Court found the same timing problem in examining the
standing of Housing Council, the third associational plaintiff. As to
Housing Council, however, the denial of standing on grounds that
there was no live controversy was even more extreme. Housing Coun-
cil had stated in an affidavit that at least seventeen member groups
"have been;are, or will be involved in the development of low- and
moderate-cost housing." 223 Moreover, one member organization, Pen-
field Better Homes, had actually applied for a zoning variance in
1969 pursuant to plans for the construction of a moderate-cost hous-
ing project. The application was rejected by the respondents. On
these grounds, Housing Council alleged on behalf of Penfield Better
Homes that the member organization "is and has been actively at-
tempting to develop moderate income housing in Penfield, but has
been stymied by its inability to secure the necessary approvals. ”221
The Court noted that in 1969, "or within a reasonable time
thereafter,"225
 Penfield Better Homes, and possibly Housing Council,
could have had standing. However, in the absence of any showing
that this 1969 project was viable and ongoing at the time the com-
plaint was filed in 1972, the Court was unwilling to infer from the al-
legations the existence of any live, concrete dispute between the
parties. 226 Thus, Housing Council, like the other associational plain-
tiffs, was denied standing. 227
2. Some Effects of the Warth Decision
The Warth opinion raises implications both for the procedural
requirements to be met in demonstrating standing and for the sub-
stantive definition of the standing doctrine. The procedural implica-
tions flow from the Court's close scrutiny of the plaintiffs' complaint
to determine the standing question. For example, the low- and
moderate-income plaintiffs were denied standing because they had
"2 1d. at 518, See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), where the Court noted
that standing "serves, on occasion, as a shorthand expression for all the various ele-
ments of justiciability." Id. at 99, quoting Hearings on S. 2097 before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 465, 498
(1966).
213
 422 U.S. at 516.
224 1d. at 497.
255 Id. at 517.
226 1d.
227 1d. The same conceptual problems are present in this ruling as those which
have been discussed in the analysis of the Court's treatment of Home Builders' claim.
See text at notes 218-22 supra. Here, however, the problem was not the prematurity of
the daim, but rather its staleness.
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failed to allege in their complaint 'facts sufficient to show that "but
for" the exclusionary zoning practices, they would have been able to
reside in Penfield. This exacting requirement prompted Justice Bren-
nan to remark, in his dissent, that the Court was forcing the plaintiffs
"to prove their cases on paper in order to get in court at all, [thus]
reverting to the form of fact pleading long abjured in the federal
Courts."228
This criticism is equally applicable to the Court's treatment of
the Metro-Act, Home Builders, and Housing Council claims.
Metro-Act had failed to allege the application of the Fair Housing Act
to its claim. Although colorable claims were arguably present under
this Act, 22a the Court would not infer them where they were not
pleaded. Home Builders' damages claim was scrutinized before the
substantive allegations in the complaint were analyzed. Because it was
not "reasonably" apparent to the Court that such damages would
inure to the benefit of individual members which the association rep-
resented, the entire claim was dismissed. As to the claim for injunctive
and declaratory relief raised by Home Builders and Housing Council,
the Court was unwilling to read the complaint as one attempting to
show a pattern and practice of exclusionary zoning. Instead, it read
the complaint literally, concerning itself only with whether the re-
spondents had in the recent past denied approval of a specific project.
As Justice Brennan accurately noted: "This Court has not re-
quired such . specificity in standing cases in the past." 23° The policy
has been to view the allegations of the complaint broadly, 23 ' leaving
for the consideration of the merits questions of appropriateness of re-
lief and the extent and effect of the challenged practices. 232 With re-
gard to Home Builders' and Housing Council's claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief, Justice Brennan noted that "the merits of the
exclusion of this or that project is not at the heart of the complaint;
the claim is that the respondents will not approve any project which
will provide residences for low and moderate income people."233
Under these circumstances, "allegations of past injury, which members
of both of these organizations have clearly made, and of a future in-
tent, if the barriers are cleared, again to develop suitable housing
for Penfield, should be more than sufficient." 234 Thus, despite the
general rule that pleadings are to be construed liberally in favor of
228 Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion by Justice Bren-
nan argued that in its treatment of the plaintiffs' claims, the Court imported into the
concept of standing "outmoded notions of pleading and justiciability" which have the
effect of tossing out of Court almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff who could be
injured by the activity claimed to be unconstitutional. Id. at 520.
229 See' text at notes 185-200 supra.
229 422 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221 See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969).
"'See note 139 supra.
"3_922 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234 Id.
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the pleader, 233 the Warth opinion has placed on notice plaintiffs bring-
ing broad public interest suits in the federal courts that their plead-
ings will be subjected to exacting scrutiny. The Court has indicated
that it will be willing to entertain suits involving broad questions of
public policy only when a judicially manageable controversy clearly ap-
pears in the complaint.
After Warth, theplaintiff challenging exclusionary zoning must
expect an extremely literal reading of the complaint by a Court
unwilling to infer from the pleadings the existence of a judicially
manageable controversy. In order to insure that the Court reaches the
merits of a challenge to exclusionary zoning, the allegations must be
framed with a high degree of factual specificity, indicating the harm
suffered, the precise source of the claim, a direct and necessary causal
relation between the specific action of the defendant and the injury
suffered, and a direct relationship between the harm alleged and the
remedy sought.
The substantive effects of Warth on the standing doctrine may
only be fully understood in light of the manner in which the Court
has approached the concept of standing in the past. There has been
consistent agreement that standing is one aspect of justiciability, a
concept which gives expression to the concern for the proper role and
function of the federal courts in a tripartite system of government. 238
There is also general agreement that the standing inquiry focuses
primarily upon the particular litigant presently before the court, ask-
ing whether this litigant is the appropriate party to bring a suit. 237
However, there has been strong disagreement over the extent to
which the concept of standing has a unique focus of its own which is
distinct from the other general concerns of justiciability.
For example, Justice Brennan has argued that the standing doc-
trine is clearly distinct from the other jurisprudential questions inher-
ent in the concept of justiciability.238 Therefore, according to Justice
Brennan's approach, the appropriate standing inquiry simply focuses
on the question of whether or not the party has been injured. The
concern over the appropriateness of judicial resolution of the issues
raised by the injured party is not a concern of standing, but rather, is
a question of "reviewability." 232
2" See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local
88, 410 F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1969). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957),
where the Court stated: "The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is'a game
of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."
3" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83. 94-95 (1968).
2" See id. at 99; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO,
P. MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 156 (2d ed. 1973).
255 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 171-73 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'69 Id. See also Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450
(1970).
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Others on the Court such as Justices Warren, Douglas and
Frankfurter have urged that standing is a concept which limits the ex-
ercise of judicial power to disputes in which the parties are adverse,
and in which they present claims in a form historically viewed as cap-
able of judicial resolution. 24° Here, the focus is not only on whether
the party has been injured, as in Justice Brennan's approach, but also
on whether the injury alleged invades a legally protected interest.
Thus, it is not only the litigant, but also the legal questions raised
which must be examined "to determine whether there is a nexus bet-
ween the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated. "9241
However, the proponents of this view caution that the question of
standing does not in itself raise issues of the separation of powers or
the fitness for adjudication of the legal question posed. These con-
cerns, according to this analysis, remain distinctly questions of
justiciability. 242
The most recent view, enunciated in United States v.
now Warth, approaches standing as a doctrine which necessarily raises
questions of justiciability. According to this approach, the appropriate
party to invoke judicial power is one who not only asserts a personal
injury and a legal interest, but who also presents issues which may
best be decided by the judicial branch. 245
 The result is a standing doc-
trine that is by definition strongly concerned with the proper role of
the judiciary. Imported into the standing doctrine itself is an aware-
ness that the judicial branch is the non-representative branch of gov-
ernment, and that a "Helaxation of standing requirements is directly
related to the expansion of judicial power." 2 " Thus, a grant of stand-
ing, according to this view, is also a statement of the degree to which
the Court is willing to assert its power. This expanded view of the
matters encompassed in the standing determination necessarily -
heightens the difficulty of meeting standing requirements, and thus
can be expected to result in the dismissal of a larger number of law-
suits on the basis of standing.
Pursuant to this view of standing, the Burger Court, unlike the
Warren Court, has been hesitant to assert judicial power where the
issue is a public matter which, in the Court's view, could be better
handled by other branches of government. 247
 This hesitancy was
2" Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151-52 (Douglas, J., writing for the majority); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (Warren, J., writing for the majority); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-52 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
-2" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
242 1d. at 100.
2" 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
94
 418 U.S. 188 (1974).
242 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222.
	4'6
	 418 U.S. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
	4'7
	 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voting reapportionment); Brown
v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer suits), with Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; Richardson, 418
U.S. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
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perhaps best expressed by Justice Powell, who stated in his concurring
opinion in Richardson:
Repeated and essentially head-on confrontations be-
tween the life-tenured branch and the representative
branches of government will not, in the long run, be bene-
ficial to either. The public confidence essential to the
former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode
if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our
power to negative the actions of the other branches. We
should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would
arise if a democracy were to permit general oversight of the
elected branches of government by the nonrepresentative,
and in large measure insulated judicial branch. 248
This view has affected the definition of standing both in terms
of the nature of the minimum injury required under Article III, and
in terms of the frequency which prudential rules of self-restraint are
applied. The effect has been to severely tighten standing require-
ments, thereby narrowing the circumstances under which a party will
be considered appropriate to litigate a claim in a federal forum.
Guided by this view of standing, the Court restated the meaning
of Article III standing requirements. Its examination in Worth of the
minimum Article III requirement of a case or controversy went
beyond a consideration of the degree of adverseness between the par-
ties. The Court also examined the personal interest of the plaintiffs to
determine whether the injury alleged was palpable, and personal;
whether it was the direct and necessary result of the challenged ac-
tions; and whether it was immediate and ripe for judicial
consideration. 249 In its focus on these factors, the Court was addition-
ally concerned with whether judicial relief would be appropriate or
necessary in the present case, and whether such relief could be
framed so as to apply only to the precise facts presented in Warth. 25 °
The theoretical problem of Congress' role in the definition of "injury
24 ' Richardson, 418 U.S. at 188 (concurring opinion). See also Brown, Quis Custodier
Ipso Custodes?—The School Prayer Cases, 1963 SLIP. CT. REV.
One does know that judicial power expands as the requirements of stand-
ing are relaxed. One knows also that if the so-called public action ... were
allowed with respect to constitutional challenges to legislation, then the
halls of Congress and of the state legislatures would become with regular-
ity only Act I of any contest to enact legislation involving public officials in
its enforcement or application. Act II would, with the usual brief inter-
lude, follow in the courts .... Relaxation of standards of standing would
be even more substantial movement toward constituting the Supreme
Court the Council of Revision that the Constitutional Convention decided
it should not be.
249 /d. at 15-16. 422 U.S. at 516.
:50
 To illustrate, see text at notes 136-39 and 193-97 supra for a discussion of the
Court's treatment of the claims of Home Builders.
384
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
in fact" for the purposes of Article III is left unresolved in the
opinion. 2 " For example, in its preliminary analysis, 252 the Court indi-
cated that a congressional grant of standing only affected the applica-
tion of prudential rules, leaving Article III requirements as separate
standards which the plaintiff must meet in any case. However, in its
treatment of Metro-Act's claim, the Court indicated that the absence
of a statute precluded the plaintiffs from establishing an Article III
injury.253
On a practical level, it also remains unclear whether different
standards of "injury" will be applied to plaintiffs who assert standing
pursuant to an express statutory grant and plaintiffs who do not. At
least as to the latter class of plaintiffs, the strict Article III require-
ments set forth in Warth apply.
A second way in which Warth substantively affected the standing
doctrine was in its indication of the manner in which the jurispruden-
tial rules of self-restraint are to be applied. To allay its concerns about
the maintenance of limits on its own power, the Court has tradition-
ally required that the plaintiff assert a personal injury which is based
upon the violation of a "legal right."'" Clearly, if a statute or a con-
stitutional provision directly applies to the particular plaintiff, this is
sufficient to establish the required legal interest. 255 However, it is also
important to examine the willingness of the Court to broaden statu-
tory or constitutional provisions by giving judicial recognition to in-
terests outside of their specific terms.
The Warth opinion indicated that the Court, at least in the area
of exclusionary zoning, takes an extremely narrow view of "judicially
cognizable injuries." This is illustrated by the Court's unwillingness to
accept several of the assumptions which have in the past allowed
plaintiffs to litigate challenges to exclusionary zoning in the various
lower federal courts. For example, although there exists substantial
data indicating a direct socioeconomic relationship between zoning ac-
tivities of satellite suburbs and the problems of the central cities, 258
the Court in Warth viewed the taxpayers' assertion of "any personal
right ... to be free of action by a neighboring municipality that may
have some incidental adverse effect on Rochester" 257 very narrowly.
Since the plaintiffs were unable to point to a statute or constitutional
provision to support their claim, the Court "discern[ed] no justifica-
tion for recognizing in the Rochester taxpayers a right of action on
the asserted claim." se
"I See note 171 supra.
353 See text at note 128 supra.
253 422 U.S. at 513-14.
2" See text at notes 55-56 supra.
255 See text at notes 74-77 supra.
355 See text and notes at 20.32 supra.
E 51 422 U.S. at 509.
"5 id. at 510.
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Even more significant for the purposes of the "legal right" de-
termination is the Court's unwillingness to imply colorable race dis-
crimination allegations in the plaintiff's complaint. Despite substantial
data which points to the disproportionate effect of exclusionary zon-
ing on racial and ethnic minorities, 2" the Court confined its consider-
ation of the complaint to the question of wealth discrimination alone.
As earlier noted,2" such a narrow approach is in direct contrast to the
approach taken by the-circuit courts in Black jack, Kennedy Park Homes,
and Metropolitan Housing Development Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
and by the district court in Sisters of Providence. 2" The Court's refusal
to recognize that a claim of wealth discrimination may imply judicially
cognizable racial or ethnic discrimination points to an unwillingness to
broaden the category of injuries deemed appropriate for judicial
intervention. 262
 This refusal necessarily increases the circumstances
under which the prudential rules of self-restraint will apply to bar a
litigant's claim.
B. Indirect Challenges: Evans v. Lynn and City of
Hartford v. Hills
In contrast to a direct challenge of allegedly exclusionary zoning
ordinances, such as the suit in Warth, some plaintiffs have brought in-
direct challenges which focus not on specific zoning ordinances but
rather on the allocation of federal funds to exclusively zoned com-
munities. In this section two such indirect challenges will be ex-
"amined: Evans v. Lynn, 283
 a pre-Warth case decided by the Second Cir-
cuit and currently being reconsidered en banc, and City of Hartford v.
Hills2" decided after Warth by a district court in the Second Circuit.
In both cases the plaintiffs, by alleging an improper allocation of fed-
eral funds—a federal agency action—were able to invoke the general
review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 265 Thus, they
avoided many of the barriers to standing which result from jurispru-
dential concerns present in a nonstatutory review situation. 266
226 See text and notes at 28-30 supra.
262 See text at notes 192-200 supra.
"1 Id.
262
 Implications for the ability of future plaintiffs effectively to challenge ex-
clusionary zoning in light of the Court's unwillingness to find a claim of wealth dis-
crimination as also alleging a claim of racial discrimination are discussed at notes 408-17
infra.
363
 —F.2d—No. 74-1793 (2d Cir. June 2, 1975) [hereinafter cited as "Evans slip
opinion"]. The text of this opinion can be found at P-H 1971 EQUAL OPPORT. IN
HOUsING 113,712.
264
 —F. Supp.—;Civil No. H-75-258 (D. Conn. Jan. 28, 1976) [hereinafter cited
as "Hartford slip opinion"]. The text of this opinion can be found at P-H 1971 EQUAL
OPPORT. IN HOUSING 1 13,742.
in 5 U.S.C. [1702 (1970).
266 See text at notes 78-88 supra for a discussion of the APA and its effect on
standing.
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Nonetheless, consideration will be directed to the extent to which the
standing requirements set forth in Warth, a case of nonstatutory re-
view, are applicable to indirect challenges of exclusionary zoning
which invoke the Administrative Procedure Act.
Since the federal funding programs relied on by the plaintiffs in
Evans2" were later altered and incorporated into the funding pro-
gram at issue in Hartford, 268 the two cases present a unique opportun-
ity to compare and contrast the standing problems raised in two dif-
fering statutory schemes in light of the standing requirements set
forth in Warth. One of the main distinctions between the two pro-
grams was that the Hartford funding program contained a specific
statutory provision that would require funds which were enjoined
from being used in one community, to be reallocated for use in a
neighboring metropolitan community.'" In contrast, the Evans
program contained no such provision. This distinction will be shown
to have significance for the finding of injury in fact as well as for the
propriety of judicial intervention—two issues which were of great
concern to the Court in Warth.
In Evans, low-income minority residents of communities in the
same county as New Castle, New York, brought suit to enjoin the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) from issuing grants of federal
funds to New Castle for construction of sewer facilities and clearance
of a swamp for recreational use. 27" The complaint alleged that New
Castle had practiced racial and economic discrimination through the
use of zoning and community development regulations. 271 Plaintiffs
further asserted that HUD and BOR each had an affirmative duty
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 272 (Title VI) and Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 19682 " (Title VIII) to encourage
non-discrimination and fair housing by reviewing the housing situa-
tion in areas requesting federal funds, and by denying funds to those
areas which maintained discriminatory housing practices. 274 There-
fore, plaintiffs concluded that a grant of funds to New Castle would
be in violation of this affirmative statutory duty. The failure of the
federal agencies to perform their affirmative duties 275 allegedly de-
nied plaintiffs, as members of racial minorities and as low-income per-
sons, an equal opportunity to benefit from the grants. 276 The result
'eT 42 U.S.C. § 3102 (1970); 16 U.S.C. § 460(1) (1970) cited in Evans slip opinion at
3888 n.3.
sea See Hartford slip opinion at 12, n.21 and 16 n.27.
In
 42 U.S.C. § 5306(e) (Supp. 1975).
'1 " Evans slip opinion at 3888-89.
2Ti Id. at 3888.
"2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
"3 42 U.S.C. § 3601-19 (1970).
'" Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
273 A duty is imposed upon HUD and BOR affirmatively to administer their
programs relating to housing and urban development by 42 U.S.C. § 3608(c) (1970).
3" 376 F. Supp. at 329.
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of this failure would be to greatly increase the likelihood that plain-
tiffs would continue to live in the very type of ghetto conditions from
which it was the duty of HUD to rescue them. Standing was asserted
on the basis of section 702 of the APA. 277
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing since the injury they suffered, that of living
in ghetto conditions, had no relationship to the particular grants in
question. 278
 The court based its denial of standing not only on the na-
ture of the relief sought, noting that the enjoining of the issuance of
grants to New Castle would not necessarily alleviate the living condi-
tions which the plaintiffs were presently forced to endure, 278 but also
on the speculative nature of the injury asserted. 28 °
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court decision and held that plaintiffs living in urban ghetto
communities have standing under section 702 of the APA to challenge
an administrative agency's failure to perform its affirmative duty
under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to encourage fair
housing through the awarding of federal grants."' The court em-
phasized that it granted the plaintiffs standing to challenge the grants
not
on the basis that they have a sufficient connection with
the community to or for the benefit of which the grants are
made ... [but] purely and simply because one important
method of enforcement of the congressional policy set
forth in Title VIII is by the agencies' administration of
grants relating either to housing or urban development.
The grants ... involved, made to an urban community, or
one that is a satellite to a metropolitan area of which appel-
lants are residents, are so related. 282
"7 Id at 333 n.8; Evans slip opinion at 3898.
278
 376 F. Supp. at 332.
2 '9 /d.
"Old. at 333. Since there was no allegation that New Castle would discriminator-
ily administer the funds for the sewer and swamp project, id. at 332-33 & n.6, the court
reasoned that to enjoin the federal grants, "it would have to be established that New
Castle's zoning laws result in unconstitutional racial and economic segregation." Id. at
332. The court noted, however, that none of the plaintiffs alleged that anyone had re-
fused to sell or lease a house to him; the plaintiffs had neither an interest in New Castle
property nor a connection with any planned housing project. Id. Following closely the
reasoning in the Warth circuit court decision, 495 F.2d 1187, 1192-93 (2d Cir. 1974),
the district court in Evans concluded that the speculative nature of the plaintiffs' injury
prevented them from establishing standing. 376 F. Supp. at 333.
say
	 slip opinion at 3988. In a concurring opinion, Judge Gurfein noted that
he would grant standing for the limited .purpose of challenging the agencies' failure to
make inquiries concerning the housing situation prior to making grants of federal
funds, but would deny standing to seek injunctive relief. Id. at 3917-19 (concurring
opinion). The majority opinion did not explicitly limit standing. While expressing no
opinion as to whether plaintiffs were entitled to relief, Evans slip opinion at 3889,
Judge Oakes did say for the majority that they had standing "to challenge the particular
grants in question." Id. at 3899.
2" Evans slip opinion at 3899.
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The court in Evans reached its conclusion that the plaintiffs had
standing by utilizing the two-part test set forth in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 283 which requires that (1)
the plaintiffs' interests be arguably within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the relevant statute, and (2) the plaintiffs be injured in
fact. 2" For purposes of this inquiry, the court assumed, first, that
plaintiffs were low-income minority residents of ghetto commu-
nities; 285
 second, that New Castle is a predominantly wealthy white
enclave which perpetuates discriminatory housing practices; 286 and
third, that HUD and BOR did not effectively evaluate New Castle's
discriminatory zoning program prior to approving the challenged
federal grants. 287
The court then considered whether the plaintiffs were within the
zone of interests of the statutes alleged to be relevant—Title VI and
Title VIII. However, before the court could conclude whether plain-
tiffs were arguably within the protected zone, the court first had to
determine the zone of interests actually covered by the Acts. More
specifically, the court had to determine whether Title VI and Title
VIII placed an affirmative duty on HUD and BOR "which would re-
quire them to take some action, not taken here, on behalf of county
residents such as withholding otherwise proper grants." 2" The court
concluded that both agencies had affirmative duties under Title VI,
which provides that "no person shall be excluded from participation,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'" How-
ever, since the statute further provides that agencies may withhold
funds from "the particular program, or part thereof," in which non-
compliance exists 2 "° and since there were no allegations that the sewer
or swamp projects, themselves, would be discriminatorily
administered, 2 "t the court acknowledged that Title VI was "not so
much involved." 2"
Title VIII, being broader in scope, received more of the court's
attention. The court indicated 293 that HUD and BOR had an affirma-
tive duty under Title VIII to consider withholding grants of funds to
urban communities with discriminatory housing practices since Title
VIII requires agencies to "administer their programs and activities re-
2"3
 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The court of appeals did not specifically cite Data Proces-
sing when it applied the test, but the district court did. 376 F. Supp. 327, 331 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
2 " See text at notes 80.86 supra for a discussion of the two-part test.
255
	 slip opinion at 3889. "Ghetto" was defined as "racially-concentrated
low-income neighborhoods." Id. at 3889-90.
296 1d. at 3890.
292 Id, at 3891.
28, 1d. at 3892.
289 42 U.S.C. 2000d (1970); Evans slip opinion at 3892-93.
290
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
79 ' Evans slip opinion at 3890 n.6.
292 Id. at 3894.
"3 Id. at 3892-93.
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lating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to
further the purposes of [the Act]," 294
 the primary purpose being "to
provide ... for fair housing throughout the United States "295 and to
promote integrated and balanced living conditions. 298
 The court
found ample support in the legislative history of Title VII1 297
 and in
the applicable case 1aW 298
 to buttress the assertion that the agencies in
question had an affirmative duty to use the funds that they would ex-
pend for housing and urban development to end the concentration of
minority groups in limited areas. 299 The court then considered
whether the specific plaintiffs fell within the protected zone and con-
cluded that, as residents of racially concentrated urban ghettos, they
were arguably within the zone of interests of Titles VI and VII1. 309
Implicit in the court's determination that HUD and BOR had an
affirmative duty to promote the purposes of Title VIII which ex-
tended to the plaintiffs in this case was the determination that the
agencies' duty encompassed the specific grants in question—funds for
sewer and swamp projects to a community abutting a metropolitan
area.30 ' The court noted that only grants "relating to housing and
urban development" were subject to the agencies' affirmative
duties. 302 Thus, absent this correlation the agencies had no affirmative
duties under Title VIII to consider the discriminatory zoning prac-
tices of New Castle.
The court found the necessary correlation with respect to the
sewer program by relying on a HUD statement indicating that sewers,
roads, schools, "and other public facilities relating to urban
development"303 are subject to the affirmative duty provisions of Title
2°' 42 U.S.C. 3608(c) (1970).
295 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
tae Evans slip opinion at 3896, quoting 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (remarks of
Senator Mondale).
Z97 Evans slip opinion at 3894-95; 114 CLING. REc. 2278, 9563 (1968) (remarks of
Senator Mondale and Representative Geller).
299 Evans slip opinion at 3895, citing Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3d Cir.
1970); Brookhaven Housing Coalition v. Kunzig, 341 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16, 27 (E.D. Mich. 1971). The court cited
these cases as lending support for the applicability of affirmative duties under Title VI
as well. Evans slip opinion at 3895.
9B9 Evans slip opinion at 3895.
3 °° Id. at 3896-97. The court reserved the question of the applicability of Title VI
for argument on the merits. Id. at 3894. Since Title VIII was broad enough in scope to
secure the proper basis for plaintiffs' standing, see discussion in text at notes 293-99
infra, the court apparently allowed plaintiffs to proceed to the merits of the Title VI
argument as well. It is not clear whether the plaintiffs could have established standing
by relying on Title VI alone.
3° ' "Here the 'statutory right' is to have programs and activities 'relating to hous-
ing and urban development' administered in furtherance of the fair housing policy.
That right is invaded by grants for sewer facilities or acquisition of recreation areas in
urban communities which are not so administered." Evans slip opinion at 3896.
"'Evans slip opinion at 3893 n.10.
2 ° 2 "A substantial number of programs are subject to [the] affirmative provisions
[of Title VIII], including those relating to urban renewal, model cities, grants for sewer
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VIII.3°4 In addition, the HUD regional administrator stated in his de-
position that the water and sewer program was subject to Title VIII
requirements.aos The HUD statement could be interpreted two ways.
It could mean that all sewer projects are considered to be related to
urban development and hence are subject to the affirmative provi-
sions of Title VIII, the apparent interpretation of the court in Evans,
or it could mean that in an urban community, road, school and sewer
projects are all subject to Title VIII affirmative provisions. This in-
terpretation would avoid the anomaly of a school or road project in a
completely rural setting being considered as "relating to housing and
urban development." The Evans court, however, did not seem to con-
sider this interpretation.
The court in Evans determined that the BOR funds for swamp
clearance related to urban development because New Castle fell
within BOR's definition of an urban area."' In addition, the court re-
lied heavily on a rather ambiguous statement made by BOR's regional
director in his deposition indicating that BOR "ought" to include ex-
isting and desirable housing patterns as a factor in determining
whether to grant funds for recreational purposes. 347
Although interpretations of an act by the agency delegated to
administer it have been accorded great weight by the Supreme
Court,308 and the Supreme Court has recently attached great weight
to the interpretation of Title VIII by an assistant regional adminis-
trator of HUD, 308 such deference generally has occurred only when
the administrator's interpretation was "the consistent administrative
construction of the Act" 3 " and his construction was confirmed by the
purpose and design of the Act. 31 ' It is not clear that the adminis-
and water installations, roads, schools and other public facilities relating to urban de-
velopment." DEPT of HoOs! NG & URBAN DEV., H isroalcai. OVERVIEW--EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, P-1-1 EQUAL OPPORT. IN HoustNic 2302, 2316 (1973).
30' Evans slip opinion at 3893.
355 Id. at 3893 n.10.
506 Id. BOR's definition includes satellite communities having a population over
2,500.1d.
507 The director stated in a depostion: "lEbtisting housing patterns and desirable
housing patterns ought to be a factor in the planning process in assessing [recreation]
needs and we attempt to encourage consideration of all community needs and not _just
to leave ourselves merely concerned with recreation, because it's important to the fabric
of this system." Id.
Hs E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Udall v. Tall-
man, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
30 ' Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
"0 Id.
"' Id. The two cases the Supreme Court cited in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, (1972) in support of its deference to the interpretation by the
regional administrator involved: (I) an interpretation of an administrative regulation by
the Secretary of the Interior, Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 2, 16 (1965); and (2) an in-
terpretation of an Act by the Commission charged with its enforcement, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). In Griggs, as in Trafficante, the construction
adopted by the Court was supported by the purpose of the Act and its legislative his-
tory. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, at 434; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210.
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trators' interpretations in Evans meet these criteria since one possible
and logical interpretation of the official HUD statement would ex-
clude sewer projects in non-urban areas such as New Castle from the
affirmative provisions of Title VIII. Similarly, it is not clear that the
same judicial deference should be given to policy considerations of a
BOR regional administrator as would be given to an agency's in-
terpretations of an Act which it administers. There is even less cause
for deference when the policy consideration is phrased in a manner
which does not indicate a "consistent administrative construction of
the Act,"312
 but merely a belief that housing "ought" to be taken into
consideration.
It is submitted that in order to have a basis for finding plaintiffs
within the zone of interests of Title VIII, the court found it necessary
to take a quite liberal attitude in interpreting the scope of the lan-
guage in the statute—"relating to housing and urban
development"—giving perhaps undue weight to the opinions of the
regional directors of HUD and BOR. If the court had construed the
statute more narrowly it might have found that the plaintiffs' pro-
tected - interests did not extend to the grants in question 31 3 and the
plaintiffs would be denied standing to challenge the grants under the
APA. 314
 Plaintiffs, therefore, would have been seeking standing in a
nonstatutory review situation and the traditioal jurisprudential con-
cerns might well have prevented them from achieving standing.
Indeed, in a dissenting opinion in Evans, Judge Moore indicated
without extensive elaboration, that Title VIII was not applicable to the
issue of plaintiffs' standing. 315
 He noted that the purpose of that Act
was to provide for fair housing3 " and that fair housing was not in-
volved in the case. 317
 In absence of a statutory grant of standing, he
found the plaintiffs could not assert an abstract injury315
 or a
generalized grievance. 3 " Reiterating32 ° the jurisprudential concerns
regarding the expansion of judicial power outlined by Justice Powell
"3
 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
3"
 Under a narrow reading of the statute, grants for swamp clearance and sewer
projects would not he considered part of housing and urban development. See Evans slip
opinion at 3893 n. 10.
314
 If the agencies had no affirmative duties under Title VI or Tide VIII, then
plaintiffs could not be "aggrieved" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 702 (1970), the
statutory grant of review. See text at notes 297-300 supra.
313
 Evans slip opinion at 3914.
333 Id.
3" Id. at 3916. "To say that plaintiffs' right to adequate housing 'is invaded by
grants for sewer facilities or acquisition of recreation areas ...' is a most illogical non
sequitur." Id.
31 ° Evans slip opinion at 3910-11, citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-94
(1974).
3" Evans slip opinion at 3911-12, citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80
(1974).
"° Evans slip opinion at 3912-13.
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in his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 321 he con-
cluded that there was no basis for standing.
The court next turned to the second part of the Data Processing
standing test, injury in fact, noting initially that federal funds which
are used to improve New Castle and other wealthy white enclaves ar-
guably could have been used to alleviate urban ghetto conditions. 322
The court also noted the possibility that funds diverted from urban
ghettos to wealthy suburbs may increase the disparity between the two
life styles. 323
 The plaintiff? injury, then, was the perpetuation of their
ghetto living conditions which might have been alleviated had HUD
and BOR performed their affirmative duties. 324
 Thus, the court al-
lowed plaintiffs to assert a generalized injury, quoting with approval
from United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP): 325
 "To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured
simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the
most injurious and widespread Government actions could be ques-
tioned by nobody. We cannot accept this conclusion." 3" The court in
Evans distinguished recent . cases that strictly limited standing327 —on
which the dissent relied—as cases of nonstatutory review and there-
fore inapposite, 328 noting that standing is conceptually broader in a
case involving statutory review. 329
The injury recognized in Evans—perpetuation of ghetto living
conditions as a result of agency inaction—appears analogous to that
found sufficient to confer standing in SCRAP, another case in which
review was based on the APA. 3" In that case, the Supreme Court al-
lowed standing to plaintiffs who asserted a very attenuated line of
causation between agency inaction and alleged harm to the environ-
ment which they used and enjoyed."' Specifically, the plaintiffs al-
"I
 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, j., concurring).
333 Evans slip opinion at 3898. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Moore argues
that if plaintiffs were awarded the injunction against the grant of federal funds to New
Castle, their living conditions probably would not be alleviated since the amount of
money involved, $400,000, "would scarcely suffice for a low-cost housing project." Id. at
3916 (dissenting opinion). Instead, he asserts, the primary result of the litigation would
be that the residents of New Castle would be prevented from receiving a much needed
sewer project and park. Id. at 3909, 3915. However, the New Castle residents would not
necessarily be prevented from receiving new sewers; they just would be prevented from
having the sewer project subsidized by federal funds.
Ha Evans slip opinion at 3898.
3 " Id.
3" 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
313 1d. at 688.
3" See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 (plaintiffs could not assert
generalized grievances); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 408, 494 (1974) (plaintiffs could
not assert the rights of third parties).
sae
	 slip opinion at 3898-99.
"* Evans slip opinion at 3899.
333
 Indeed, the court in Evans buttressed its finding of standing by citing SCRAP.
Evans slip opinion at 3898.
331 412 U.S. at 685.
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leged that the failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission to sus-
pend a surcharge on all railroad freight rates would "discourage the
use of 'recyclable' materials, and promote the use of new raw materi-
als that compete with scrap, thereby adversely affecting the environ-
ment by encouraging unwarranted mining, lumbering, and other ex-
tractive activities."332
The injury alleged in Evans is nonetheless one step removed
from that in SCRAP. In SCRAP, plaintiffs alleged that agency inaction
would result in a deterioration of their living conditions. In Evans, on
the other hand, plaintiffs alleged that agency inaction would result in
the continuation of their present living conditions.333 Although the
Court in SCRAP acknowledged that the destruction of the environ-
ment was a sufficient injury to allow standing, 334 it is not clear that
perpetuation of one's present living conditions as a result of agency
inaction is entirely comparable. Moreover, since in SCRAP, the plain-
tiffs alleged injury to the environment, it was clear that they, as in-
habitants and users of the environment arguably would be adversely
affected by any deterioration of the environment. In contrast, the
Evans court could only hypothesize that the funds that were allocated to
the town of New Castle might otherwise have been used to alleviate
their ghetto conditions.'" The Evans plaintiffs could not assure the
court that the perpetuation of their living conditions resulted directly
from the "misallocation" of the challenged funds. As the Supreme
Court cautioned in Sierra Club v. Morton: 338 "[B]roadening the
categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a
different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party
seeking review must himself have suffered an ipjury." 331
The importance of a specific, personal injury was also under-
scored in Warth. Noting that Congress may grant persons a right of
action by providing statutory review, the Court in Warth emphasized:
"Of course, Article III's requirement remains: the plaintiff still must
allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself," 339 even if it is shared
by others. The Supreme Court thus characterized the distinct and
palpable injury requirement as a minimum constitutional mandate, 339
distinguishable from a jurisprudential requirement in that it cannot be
waived by Congress or the Court. It is submitted that the Evans
plaintiffs' alleged injury—the perpetuation of their living conditions
as a result of the challenged funding—is analogous to the injury al-
leged by the low-income, minority non-residents of Penfield in Warth:
the perpetuation of their living conditions as a result of Penfield's ex-
3" Id. at 676.
333 Evans slip opinion at 3897-98.
334 412 U.S. at 685.
"5 Evans slip opinion at 3898.
33° 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
337 1d. at 738.
33" 422 U.S. at 501.
33" 422 U.S. at 499, 501.
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clusionary zoning practices. The Supreme Court rejected the Warth
plaintiffs' injury:
[T]he fact that these petitioners share attributes common to
persons who may have been excluded from residence in the
town is an insufficient predicate for the conclusion that
petitioners themselves have been excluded, or that the re-
spondents' assertedly illegal actions have violated their
rights. Petitioners must allege and show that they personally
have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by
other, unidentified members of the class to which they be-
long and which they purport to represent. 3"
The Court noted that the Penfield non-residents had failed to allege
that their injury resulted "in any concretely demonstrable way" from
the towns' alleged exclusionary practices. 34 ' It is submitted that the
Evans plaintiffs similarly cannot meet the standards set forth in Warth
since they cannot demonstrate concretely that the perpetuation of
their living conditions results directly from the allocation of funds to
New Castle. Thus they fail to meet the requirement of a "direct and
palpable" injury mandated by Article III.
These problems, arising from the analysis of the injury in fact
requirement set forth in Mirth, illustrate how Warth might be applied
to deny standing in a case invoking statutory review. Even if alle-
gations such as those in Evans are found to be sufficient to establish
standing under Warth and the plaintiffs are able to proceed to the
merits, they may encounter further difficulties inherent in the process
of indirect challenges to exclusionary zoning practices under the
statutory scheme present in Evans. The first difficulty is the substan-
tial burden of proving that an unconstitutional motive lies behind a
zoning ordinance which is neutral on its face. 342 In light of the refusal
of the Supreme Court in Warth to recognize the racially discrimina-
tory effect of wealth discrimination, 343 plaintiffs probably will not be
able to sustain that burden.
A further problem, which also troubled the Warth Court, is
whether the relief requested of the court will actually alleviate the al-
leged injury. As the dissenting opinion in Evans noted, the relief re-
quested in that case—an injunction against the issuance of federal
funds amounting to $400,000—probably would not affect the plain-
tiffs' living conditions. 344 The court thus has no assurance that the
3" Id. at 502.
3" Id. at 504.
3" Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls
and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L. J. 483, 487 & n.13 (1973).
343 See id.; cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971). For an anlaysis of
the issues involved in a court's review of legislative motive see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:
An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95.
"Evans slip opinion at 3916.
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particular plaintiffs bringing suit would receive any benefit from the
injunction.345
A third problem facing plaintiffs who achieve standing is the
question whether the court has the authority to issue an injunction at
all.346 The majority opinion in Evans expressed no opinion on the
subject."' Judge Gurfein, in his concurring opinion, however, indi-
cated that although the plaintiffs had standing to challenge HUD's
and BOR's failure to consider factors relevant to their affirmative
duties under Title VIII, 343
 he would deny plaintiffs standing to actu-
ally enjoin the federal grants. 34° Since the plaintiffs were basically
challenging the agencies' failure to considlr the housing practices of
communities receiving grants, 35 ° it is possible that the "relief" ulti-
mately granted in Evans will be limited M an order that HUD and
BOR institutionalize a method of considering the relevant racial and
socioeconomic factors prior to granting federal funds. If HUD and
BOR elect to make the grants after instituting proper consideration
procedures3" plaintiffs could still institute a later suit challenging the
decision.352 The Supreme Court has noted, however, that the scope of
345
 In another case in which plaintiffs invoked the APA, the Supreme Court de-
nied plaintiffs standing when they had neglected to assert that they specifically would
be harmed in any way by the agency action being challenged. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at
740. The concern of the judiciary over the efficacy of [judicial relief will be shown to be
eliminated under the statutory scheme relied on in City of Hartford v. Hills, Civil No.
H-75-258 (D. Conn. 1975) discussed infra at notes 37477.
343 Cf. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 690. Once the SCRAP plaintiffs established standing,
the Court went on to conclude that it had no jurisdictiOn to issue an injunction. Id.
347 See Evans slip opinion at 3889.
343 Id. at 3918 (concurring opinion).
343 1d. at 3917, 3919-20.
333
 Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327, 331 (1974)
3" If, after undergoing proper review procedines (see generally Shannon v. HUD,
436 F.2d 809, 821.22 (1970) for a discussion of such procedures) HUD and BOR de-
termined that New Castle's zoning discriminated along economic but not racial lines,
then the proposed federal grants could not be detrim4ntal to the fair housing policy set
forth in Title VIII (which is concerned with racial, not economic discrimination) and
federal funds could be granted for the swamp and sewer projects. Courts either would
refuse to review this decision (see note 351 infra; Evanj, slip opinion at 3917-18 (concur-
ring opinion) or, if the decision were reviewed, would uphold it as rational, and not
"arbitrary and capricious." See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 822 (3d Cir. 1970).
353 Courts may refuse to review agency decisions only in the event that statutes
prohibit review or agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 (a) (1970). The Supreme Court has interpreted' the review provision of the APA
broadly so as to presume judicial review in the absence of "clear and convincing evi-
dence of a contrary legislative intent." Abbott Labs.l v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141
(1967), citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962). There is no "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" of congressional intent to preclude decisions of HUD and BOR from ju-
dicial review. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 818, 82) (1970). But see Hahn v. Gottlieb,
430 F.2d 1243 (1970), where the court refused to review a HUD decision. The reason-
ing in Hahn, however, has been implicitly rejected in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). See McCabe, Recent Developments in Judicial Review of
Administrative Actions: A Developmental Note, 24 ADMIN. L. REV. 67, 94 (1972). The set of
circumstances in which a Secretary's decision escapes judicial review, if he has been
granted discretion by law, has been the subject of intensive debate. See, e.g., L. Jaffee,
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review of agency action is very narrow: "The court is not empowered
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." 353 To be successful,
a plaintiff would need to demonstrate that the agency's decision was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law." 354 Under this standard the courts generally have
upheld substantive agency decisions when supported by an adequate
factual basis. 335
It is submitted that as a result of (1) the attenuated connection
which sewer construction and swamp clearance have with "housing
and urban development," a connection which a court less liberal than
the court in Evans might not be able to appreciate; (2) the inherently
amorphous nature of' the Evans plaintiffs' injury; (3) the substantial
burden of proving that a zoning ordinance, neutral on its face, was
enacted for unconstitutional purposes; (4) the lack of assurance that
the injunctive relief requested in an indirect challenge would actually
alleviate plaintiffs' poor living conditions; and (5) the very limited rem-
edy likely to be afforded plaintiffs who adopt the indirect approach,
the indirect approach adopted under the statutory scheme present in
Evans would not have developed into an effective means of seriously
attacking the problems of exclusionary zoning.
A recent change in the statutory scheme under which federal
grants to cities are made has significantly improved the possibility of
establishing standing in an indirect challenge aimed at decreasing the
use of exclusionary zoning practices. In City of Hartford v. Hills, 356 the
city of Hartford, eight city officials, 357 and two members of a class
that consisted of minority as well as low- and moderate-income per-
sons living in inadequate housing in Hartford alleged that the Secre-
un mar, CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 181-82 (1965); Berger, Administrative Ar-
bitrariness: A synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not al-
ways Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1967); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional
Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion,", 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
353 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). See gen-
erally McCabe, supra note 352, at 402-04 for a discussion of recent cases illustrating the
extent to which the courts have been willing to defer to agency discretion.
354 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 413-16 (1970). See McCabe, supra note 352. But see Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv, 1669, 1781-89 (1975) for a discussion of
stricter standards of judicial review.
366 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289,
300-01, (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm.. 449 F.2d 1109. 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
356 Civil No. H-75-258 (D. Conn. Jan. 28, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Hartford slip
opinion]. The text of this opinion can be found at P.H. 1971 EQUAL OPPORT. IN
HOUSING II 13,742.
357
 The court dismissed the suit as to these plaintiffs since their only "injury" was
their alleged inability to perform their official duties and responsibilities because of
HUD's improper approval of grant applications. Hartford slip opinion at 9. The court
held that these plaintiffs had no legal interest in the outcome of the suit, and therefore
did not have standing. Id. at 10.
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tary of Housing and Urban Development and other officials 358 impro-
perly approved the grants of federal funds to seven of Hartford's
suburbs. The plaintiffs alleged that the grants in question were im-
proper since HUD disregarded "the emphasis in the [suburb's]
applications for non-housing expenditures, and upon local rather
than regional needs,"3 " and sought an injunction against the use of
the funds, claiming that the defendants had failed to fulfill their ob-
ligations under various federal statutes. 36°
In essence, the plaintiffs alleged that (1) under Title I of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 38 ' (the "Housing
Act of 1974") it was an abuse of discretion for HUD to approve appli-
cations for community development funds when the Act mandated
that the applications be disapproved; 362 (2) under Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968383 HUD failed to "affirmatively administer"
the community development program in order to facilitate low- and
moderate-cost housing in Hartford's suburbs; 364
 and (3) under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 365
 HUD improperly approved the
grant applications "in the face of a history by [the] applicant com-
munities of discriminatory housing, zoning, and land use practices
"366
The Housing Act of 1974 played a significant role in the court's
analysis of the standing issue. This Act is designed to alleviate the
problems of the urban areas."' Particular emphasis is placed on in-
adequate housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income indi-
viduals: under the Act, funds are to be given to a community only
after it has submitted a three-year community development program
designed to give "maximum feasible priority to activities which will
benefit low- or moderate-income families or aid in the prevention or
3" The Regional Administrator and Area Director of HUD were also named as
defendants. The officials were sued only in their official capacities. Id. at 2 and n.5.
"9 Hartford slip opinion at 1.
3" Id., at 2, citing Title 1 of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. *15301-17 (Supp. 1975); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. * 2000d
0 seq. (1970). Plaintiffs also invoked constitutional claims under the civil rights statutes,
42 U.S.C. 11 1981, 1982 and 1985, and the Fifth Amendment. Hartford, slip opinion at
2.
331 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. 1975).
352 Hartford slip opinion at 3. See text at notes 370-72 infra.
363 42 U.S.C. *3601-19 ( 1970).
334 Hartford slip opinion at 3.
335
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
356 Hartford slip opinion at 3 quoting paragraph 31 of the Complaint.
"7 /d. at 5. The statute states that:10e primary objective of this chapter is the
development of viable urban communities, by providing decent housing and a suitable
living environment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of
low and moderate income." 42 U.S.C. § 530I(c) (Supp. 1975). The Act is a consolida-
tion of ten development programs administered by HUD. See Hartford slip opinion at
16 n.27 for a list of the programs.
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elimination of slums or blight." 3" The application for funds must in-
clude, among other information, a housing assistance plan which (1)
accurately assesses the current housing stock in the community; (2)
determines the housing needs of lower-income individuals expected to
reside in the community; (3) specifies a realistic annual goal for the
provision of low-income housing; and (4) indicates the locations for
planned housing for low-income individuals. 3"
The Hartford suit was brought because HUD approved applica-
tions for grants under the Housing Act of 1974 to suburbs that al-
legedly had not fulfilled the statutory obligations of developing a
housing assistance plan. 37° Most of the suburbs involved estimated
that "zero" lower-income persons were expected to reside in the
community, therefore distorting the "needs" section of their
applications. 3 " Plaintiffs alleged that had the low-income housing
needs of the community been more accurately described, the projects
proposed by the towns for the, use of the federal funds would have
been found to be inappropriate to meet those needs, necessitating the
disapproval of the applications by the Secreatry of HUD. 372
The district court found that the city of Hartford clearly had
standing. First, the city was within the zone of interests of the Hous-
ing Act of 1974: the Act was designed to ease urban blight and Hart-
ford was an urban area faced with serious economic and housing
problems. 373
 Second, the city demonstrated an injury in fact since,
under the Housing Act of 1974, funds which are disapproved are
reallocated, with metropolitan areas of the same state receiving first
priority.374
 The court noted that Hartford, therefore, was clearly in-
jured if the challenged grant had been approved in a manner con-
trary to law. 375 This stands in sharp contrast to the statutory scheme
under which the challenged federal funds were granted in Evans,
which did not provide for reallocation of disapproved funds. 376 Be-
cause of the specific allocation procedures contained in the statute,
the Hartford court, unlike the Evans court, was assured that injunctive
relief would most probably cause the enjoined funds to be reallocated
to the plaintiffs. Because of the different statutory provision, the
Hartford plaintiffs could state a much more direct causal relationship
between the injury alleged and the claim sought to be adjudicated.
399
 42 U.S.C. §§ 5304(a)(1), (b)(2) (Supp. ,
"9 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (Supp. 1975).
"° Hartford slip opinion at 19-21.
371 1d. at 20. The communities submitted a "zero" expected to reside figure on
their applications as a result of a memorandum issued by an official of HUD. The
memorandum stated that communities would be granted funds even if they did not
submit figures in the "expected to reside" category. Id. at 21-23.
at* Id. at 21.
373 /d. at 5-8.
' 74 Id. at 8-9, citing 42 U.S.C. § 5306(e) (Supp. 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 570.409(f)(1)(i)
(1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 42347, 42348 (Sept. 12, 1975).
333 Hartford slip opinion at 9.
376 42 U.S.C. § 3102 (1970) and 16 U.S.C. 4601 (1970).
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Thus, the Hartford court noted that the city of Hartford "certainly
stands to benefit in a tangible way from this court's intervention,
thereby meeting the Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the
`injury-in-fact' requirement."377
Although the court found the standing question of the indi-
vidual low-income and minority plaintiffs more difficult, 378 it con-
cluded that they also had standing. 378
 The court considered the indi-
vidual plaintiff? basis for standing under both the Housing Act of
1974 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commencing its
analysis with the former.
The court noted at the outset that as poor persons living in sub-
standard housing in Hartford, the plaintiffs were "certainly" within
the zone of interests of the Housing Act of 1974, since language in
the Act clearly demonstrated that it was intended to benefit persons
of low and moderate income. 380
 Although the defendants, relying on
Warth, argued that the individual plaintiffs' suit should have been
dismissed for failure to state a claim,38 ' the court distinguished Warth
as a case not based on a statute and therefore inapposite. 382 Instead,
the court found that Evans was the controlling decision in its
circuit.383
 The court noted that the Evans plaintiffs' standing was
grounded on an allegation that federal agencies did not perform their
affirmative duties to administer their programs in order to promote
fair housing opportunities. 384 The individual Hartford plaintiffs' alle-
gations similarly accused HUD of improperly approving grants.
Under the redirected priorities scheme, plaintiffs were arguably pre-
vented from receiving otherwise reallocable funds as a result of
HUD's allegedly improper approval of the suburbs' applications.
Therefore, the plaintiffs had standing under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act as persons aggrieved by agency action. 383
Turning next to the basis for standing under the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, the court indicated that for the same reasons stated in
Evans plaintiffs had standing under Title VIII of that Act: "Here, as
there, we have plaintiffs who claim injury from purposeful adminis-
317 Hartford slip opinion at 9, citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
3" Hartford slip opinion at 10.
378 id. at 14-15.
3" Id. at 11.
381 Id.
3" Id. at 11-12. It is interesting to note that although the Hartford court claimed
that Worth was not controlling, it later indicated that the plaintiffs met the standing re-
quirements set forth in Warth. Id. at 14.
383 Id. at 12. The court noted but did not comment upon the fact that Evans is
being reheard en bane. The fact that Warth, a Supreme Court decision, came down after
Evans, and that Evans is being reheard, dilutes somewhat that decision's immediate prec-
edential value. The statute relied on in Hartford, however, seems to have changed the
basis of standing sufficiently so that many of the weaknesses in the Evans court's finding
of injury are no longer problems. See text following note 355 infra, for a summary of
the problems found in Evans.
384 Hartford slip opinion at 12-13.
333 id. at 14-15.
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trative inaction. Here, as there, the improper approval of grants may
perpetuate existing patterns of racial (and economic) segregation.
This claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 distinguishes Warth v.
Se/din , . "386
The basis for the court's finding of injury under the Housing
Act of 1974 bears closer examination. In recognizing this injury, the
court cited language in both the Act387
 and the federal regulations388
that requires disapproved funds to be reallocated first to a community
within the same metropolitan area as the one whose funds were cut
off. The court reasoned that the city of Hartford would have ben-
efited from the reallocation of the funds. 389
 In so reasoning, the court
apparently ignored a provision in the federal regulations which re-
quires that reallocated funds be used first to fulfill the "urgent needs"
of a cornmunity. 39° A community qualifies as having "urgent needs" if
the funds originally allocated to it under various HUD programs are
found to be insufficient to complete an ongoing project which had
been approved by HUD."' If there are no urgent needs in the same
metropolitan area then the funds are to be reallocated to a different
metropolitan area within the same state. 392 Thus, unless Hartford
qualified as having urgent needs, it had no legitimate expectation that
the challenged funding would be reallocated to benefit Hartford. It
would seem, then, that the court's finding of a judicially cognizable in-
jury rests on the assumption that Hartford could establish urgent
needs which would qualify for the reallocated funds. Since demon-
strating an urgent need might not have been difficult for Hartford,
the court's assumption does not represent a serious problem. 393
Another aspect of the finding of injury under the statute re-
quires closer scrutiny. The court seems to have concluded that the
plaintiffs were injured as a result of the existence of and non-
compliance with a statute. As indicated earlier in this comment, 384 it is
questionable whether a plaintiff may be granted standing solely on the
basis of an injury created by the existence of a statute. In Evans, it
should be noted, the court held that the plaintiffs' injury was their
ghetto living conditions which were allegedly perpetuated as a result
a" Id., at 15, citing Accion Hispana v. Town of New Canaan, Civ. No. B-312 (D.
Conn. Aug. 18, [975). It is important to note that in relying on Title VIII the plaintiffs
claimed the perpetuation of racial patterns of segregation. It was the lack of allegations
concerning racial segregation which presented the Court in Warth from finding Title VIII to
be applicable in that suit. Warth, 422 U.S. at 513, n.21. See text at notes 185-88 supra.
at" Id. at 8, citing 42 U.S.C. § 5306(e) (Supp. 1975).
38 'Id. at 9, citing 24 C.F.R. 570.409(f)(1)(i) (1975); 40 Fed. keg. 42347, 42348
(Sept. 12, 1975).
3" Hartford slip opinion at 9,
1"" 24 C.F.R. § 570.409(d) (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 92348 (Sept. 12, 1975).
3"
 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.401(b)(1), (3) (1975).
3
" 1 Id. 570.409(1)(1); 40 Fed. Reg. 42348 (Sept. 12, 1975).
3"3 See Hartford slip opinion at 6-8 n.I9, for a discussion of the serious housing
problems facing the city of Hartford.
3" See discussion in text and note 171 supra.
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of federal agency action. 395 In Hartford, since much the same
socioeconomic situation existed, the court could easily have found that
the, individual plaintiffs' injury was that of being forced to reside in
"deteriorating, inadequate or overly-costly housing." 396 Similarly, the
city's injury could have been found to be its urban blight.'" Recogni-
tion of these underlying injuries was, perhaps, implicit in the Hartford
court's finding of injury. It is submitted, however, that the court
would have had a sounder basis for its grant of standing had it clearly
set forth reasons such as those above for its finding of standing,
rather than relyi4 solely on the statutory provisions of the Housing
Act of 1974. As noted by the Court in Warth, "Congress may grant an
express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by
prudential standing. rules. Of course, Art. III's requirement remains:
the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself
.... "3" Future plaintiffs should therefore be more explicit in their
allegations of injury.
Despite these minor problems with the court's analysis, there are
three reasons why the resolution of the standing question in Hartford
seems to rest on a much sounder basis than that in Evans. First, due
to the clearvut provisions of the Housing Act of 1974, it was not
necessary kir the court to enter into any strained interpretations of
the statute involved to bring the plaintiffs within the act's zone of
interest.'" Second, the injury alleged in Hartford was much more
palpable than that alleged in Evans. The Evans plaintiffs complained
of the perpetuation of their living conditions as a result of the actions
of federal agencies, and could only hypothesize that if the challenged
funds were enjoined their situation might be improved. In contrast,
under the statutory scheme relied on in Hartford, it was clear that if
HUD had disapproved the suburbs' applications, there was a high
probability that the funds would have been reallocated to Hartford.
Thus Hartford. and its low-income residents were injured by HUD's
improper approval of the funds. Even though the court did not
clearly articulate the "injury" of urban blight, it seems implicit in the
court's holding and thus the requirements of Article III were satis-
fied. Third, and again as a result of the statutory scheme, the Hartford
court was assured that if it provided the judicial remedy
requested—an injunction against the grants—the relief would most
probably inure to the benefit of the specific plaintiffs before it. Thus
the court was able to avoid one of the major stumbling blocks, placed
before the plaintiffs in Warth: that of showing the appropriateness or
efficacy of judicial intervention.
age
	 slip opinion at 3898.
399 Hartford slip opinion at 1-2.
397 See id. at 6 n.14.
3" 422 U.S. at 501 (1975).
399 See text at note 313 supra for a discussion of the arguably strained interpreta-
tions used by the Evans court.
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III. WHO CAN CHALLENGE LOCAL ZONING ORDINANCES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
In Warth, the Court clearly indicated that in nonstatutory review
cases it will not tackle the problem of exclusionary zoning practices in
the context of regional metropolitan growth in a broad, remedial
manner. It has consequently been argued that Warth "tosses out of
court almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff who could be injured
by the activity claimed to be unconstituttonal," 40° and that it rules on
standing so as "to close the doors of the federal courts to claims of
this kind."4"
It is certainly true that the decision both limits the type of plain-
tiff who may challenge exclusionary zoning, and the nature of the cir-
cumstances under which the plaintiff will be permitted to assert his
claim. There remain, however, a narrow set of circumstances under
which particular parties may be allowed to directly challenge
exclusionary zoning in the federal courts. It is clear after Warth that
(1) non-resident individuals eligible for low- or moderate-cost housing,
(2) builders and developers attempting to construct low- or
moderate-cost housing, and possibly (3) residents of a community in
which exclusionary zoning laws have been in effect may, in some cir-
cumstances, bring a direct challenge to exclusionary zoning. 402 The
following analysii discusses each of these types of plaintiffs separately,
suggesting the circumstances under which each type may successfully
assert standing and examining the grounds upon which the court will
treat a claim for relief.
A. Direct Challenges (Nonstatutory Review)
1. Non-resident, minority individuals with . low or moderate incomes
According to Warth, the non-resident plaintiffs must allege a dis-
tinct and palpable injury to themselves as a direct result of the chal-
lenged zoning. 4" This standard requires a showing that the plaintiffs
are prevented from moving into a zoned area solely as a result of the
community's zoning practices, and not because there is no builder in-
terested in constructing a project priced within the plaintiffs' means.
A crucial factor, then, becomes the existence of a current housing
project which will meet the needs of low-income plaintiffs. Thus, in
'°° 422 U.S. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 ' Id. at 528. "Today's decision will be read as revealing hostility to breaking
down even unconstitutional zoning barriers that frustrate the deep human yearning of
low income and minority groups for decent housing they can afford in decent sur-
roundings." Id. at 528-29.
402 In light of the Court's ruling on the ability of plaintiffs to assert third party
rights, it seems unlikely that either taxpayers or interest groups alleging no other in-
terest than a desire for the challenged community to change its zoning policies will ef-
fectively be able to assert standing to challenge exclusionary zoning.
4Q3 See 422 U.S. at 508.
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order for such plaintiffs to establish standing, there must be some
showing that: (1) an attempt has been made to construct such a proj-
ect; (2) the particular plaintiffs are eligible for such housing and are
willing to move if given the opportunity; and (3) the attempt to begin
the project was blocked by the enforcement of an exclusionary zoning
ordinance."' The Mirth opinion notes that it is only in this limited set
of circumstances that the court will be able to fashion a remedy pre-
cisely tailored to the claims of the plaintiffs. Otherwise, the court faces
the danger of setting out standards broadly regulating regional de-
velopment, an activity which War111 suggests may be better left to the
democratic processes- 4 ° 5
As Justice Brennan indicates in his dissent, the Court has made
the rights of low-income, minority plaintiffs, excluded from a com-
munity because of zoning practices, dependent upon the willingness
of a third party first to attempt to build the project, and then to liti-
gate the matter when the project is precluded by exclusionary zoning
devices:Jim This is true, Justice Brennan points out,
despite the fact that the third party may have no economic
incentive to incur the costs of litigation with regard to one
project, and despite the fact that the low-income minority
plaintiffs' interest is not to live in a particular project but to
live somewhere in the town in a dwelling they can
afford
Even where circumstances are present that enable the individual
non-resident to establish standing, he must be extremely careful in
framing the allegations in the complaint to make an effective challenge.
If the plaintiff simply asserts deprivation of liberty or property in vio-
lation of due process, the challenged zoning ordinance will be sub-
jected to the rational relationship test. 408 As noted earlier,'" broad
deference is given to municipalities in their land use decisions, making
it extremely rare for a zoning ordinance to be struck down on due
process . grounds .
It is only on the ground of equal protection that the zoning or-
dinance will be subjected to strict scrutiny requiring the state to justify
401 See id. at 504-06.
4°' See id. at 508 & n.18.
'°° Id. at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1" Id. Brennan's observation is vividly illustrated by the district court's treatment
of the standing issues in Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio
1974), remanded without published opinion, 521 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1975), where standing
was denied to black non-residents who challenged exclusionary zoning devices. The
court noted that the project which had been denied a building permit had lost its finan-
cial backing and had ceased to be viable; thus there was no longer a "live" controversy.
Id. at 736.
4" Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974); Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926); Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County
v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
40° See text at notes 6-11 supra.
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the ordinance by a compelling state interest. 40 Strict judicial scrutiny
is applied in only two circumstances: (1) where the statute or ordi-
nance in question effects an allegedly suspect classification; or (2) the
statute or ordinance in question allegedly invades a fundamental
interest."'
There is little likelihood that a low-income plaintiff would be
able to argue successfully than an exclusionary zoning ordinance in-
vades a fundamental interest. The Supreme Court in Lindsey v.
Norinet 4 " refused to recognize a constitutionally protected right to de-
cent housing." The Court has likewise held that the recognized fun-
damental right to travel does not encompass the right to live or settle
where one wishes. 414
Further, it is clear that the low-income plaintiff cannot invoke
strict scrutiny simply by claiming that the zoning practices exclude
moderate- and low-income people. The Court has consistently refused
to regard wealth as a suspect classification." Moreover, Warth made
it clear that the Court will recognize a claim of race discrimination
only where certain precise allegations appear in the complaint. The
Court was unwilling to assume a nexus between poverty and race:"
alleging that the zoning ordinance discriminates on the basis of
wealth, thereby having the well-documented, secondary effect of dis-
criminating on the basis of race, is in itself insufficient to establish a
claim of racial or ethnic discrimination.'" Consequently, plaintiffs
challenging exclusionary zoning may be assured of strict scrutiny of
the ordinance in question only where they have specifically alleged ra-
cial discrimination in the complaint. In order to be certain of raising
an equal protection claim which invokes the strict scrutiny test, the
plaintiff must allege that the zoning ordinance in question is racially
discriminatory in both purpose and effect.
2. Builders and Developers
Circuit court opinions consistent with Warth suggest that a de-
veloper acting alone may bring suit to challenge exclusionary zoning
"° Compare Construction Indus, Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma,
522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976) (due
process analysis), with Black jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1972) (equal protection
analysis) and Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975)
(equal protection analysis). For a general discussion of the Warren Court's broadening
of the Equal Protection Clause, see Note, Developments in the Law of Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
4 " San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1972).
4 " 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
"3 1d. at 73-74. See also R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 35'
(1973).
d" James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137; 140 (1971). See also R. BABCOCK &
F. BOSS ELMAN, SUpra note 413, at 35.
"° E.g., San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
416 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971). See also R. BABCOCK & F.
BOSSELMAN,SUpra note 413 at 35.
4 " 422 U.S. at 513 n.21.
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practices.418 However, the developer must first meet the requirement
of a "direct and palpable" injury to himself to establish standing.
Warth indicates that to satisfy this test, a builder must point to a
specific viable project which, within a reasonable time of the suit, has
been blocked by the challenged zoning ordinance. 413 If a builder satis-
fies this requirement, he is then in a position to argue the merits of
the case. The grounds upon which builders and developers may chal-
lenge exclusionary zoning practices seem limited to due process, as
these plaintiffs assert economic injury rather than violation of a fun-
damental right. Thus, the ultimate effectiveness of their challenge is
doubtful. To withstand a challenge on due process grounds, a zoning
ordinance need only bear a rational relationship to a valid state in-
terest. In light of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 420 Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 421 and Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County
v. City of Petaluma, 422 it would seem that most zoning ordinances
would be found to be "rationally related," and the builder would lose
on the merits.
Only if a builder could assert the violation of a fundamental
right would he invoke the stricter requirements of the compelling in-
terest test. Since the builder bringing suit alone could only assert
economic injury, his ability to assert the violation of a fundamental
right would depend upon the court's willingness to allow the plaintiff
to assert the rights of third parties. Warth suggests that a mere "con-
gruity of interests" between a potential . plaintiff and third parties who
wish to reside in low-cost housing is an insufficient reason to allow the
plaintiff to raise third party rights. 423 Therefore, in order to raise
these rights, a builder would have to show: (1) that the ordinance pre-
cluded or otherwise adversely affected a special ongoing relationship
between the builder and those third persons whose rights have been
violated; 424 or (2) that the litigation was necessary to ensure the pro-
tection of the third party rights asserted. 425
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which either of these cir-
cumstances would exist. The type of relationship which a builder
might establish with a non-resident individual adversely affected by
"8 See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975).
" 9 422 U.S. at 517.
'20
 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See text at notes 3-5 supra.
481 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
428 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). Here, builders were granted standing to chal-
lenge alleged exclusionary zoning practices. They alleged economic injury as a result of
the town's zoning. Because their interest was economic and not "fundamental," they
were permitted to challenge the ordinance only on the basis of its rationality. Following
Belle Terre and Euclid, the court upheld the ordinance. The plan of controlled growth
adopted by the town was considered rational.
423 422 U.S. at 515.
484 See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
422 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953).
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exclusionary zoning ordinances is the very relationship which would
allow the individual to bring suit on his own behalf. If a builder estab-
lished a legal relationship with a non-resident by means of a contract
for low-cost housing, then the non-resident could assert his own legal
interest in the contract. Therefore, the builder bringing suit alone
could not claim that prosecution of the suit was the only means by
which the interests of the non-resident would be protected. Where an
individual may bring suit on his own behalf, the court will not allow a
different plaintiff to raise that individual's rights. 426
In light of these considerations, it seems clear that the builder or
developer, bringing a challenge to exclusionary zoning on his own,
will be limited to a due process argument. In order effectively to chal-
lenge a zoning ordinance, a builder must, therefore, bring suit in con-
junction with specific non-resident plaintiff's who could have afforded
to move into the thwarted project. Only by joining his claim with that
of individual plaintiffs will the builder be able to assert violations of
equal protection and thus invoke the strict scrutiny test.
3. Residents of the zoned community
The Warth decision made it clear that in the absence of a specific
statutory provision, no resident of a town has a "legal right" to live in
an integrated community.-027 Thus, in order to establish standing to
challenge exclusionary zoning in such cases, residents must allege that
they are "aggrieved" within the meaning of Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, much as the apartment residents did in Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 428 In Trafficante, plaintiffs were
granted standing to assert the right to live in an integrated apartment
complex. 4 " However, the Court could easily distinguish Trafficante by
refusing to recognize an analogous injury in the context of a com-
munity, since a resident could not be sure that any of the excluded
persons would live near him if the Court invalidated the zoning
ordinance. 4 " The residents' problems are further complicated by the
Warth caveat that to base a complaint on Title VIII, one must do
more than allege that the zoning ordinance has the effect of excluding
minorities; the zoning ordinances must allegedly have been enacted
with the purpose and intent of excluding minorities."'
If a resident nevertheless was able to achieve standing, the re-
fusal of the Court in recent years to recognize a nexus between pov-
erty and race432 indicates that the plaintiff would bear a heavy burden
of proof on the merits of his claim. To be successful, a plaintiff would
"6 Worth, 422 U.S. at 510.
'" 422 U.S. at 512-14.
4" 409 U.S. 205, 206-08. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 514.
4 " 409 U.S. at 212.
43° But see Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730, 741 (1979) (dictum),
remanded without published opinion, 521 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1975)
431 422 U.S. at 513 n.21.
432 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
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need to prove that the zoning ordinance in question was enacted
purely to promote racial discrimination and that it has had such an
effect. 433
 Proof of discrimination on the basis of wealth would not be
sufficient.
B. Indirect Challenges (Review under
the Administrative Procedure Act)
Plaintiffs may choose to challenge exclusionary zoning practices
indirectly by filing a suit to contest grants of funds by federal agencies
to those communities which have maintained such practices. Under
this type of challenge, plaintiffs may be granted standing on the basis
of the Administrative Procedure Act as persons aggrieved by a fed-
eral agency action. 434
 As a result of the change in the statutory
scheme since Evans 435
 most such suits will be brought under the Hous-
ing Act of 1974, as was done in Hartford.
Under this approach, low-income individuals residing in sub-
standard housing in a metropolitan city would have standing to chal-
lenge the improper approval of an application for HUD funds by a
community within the same metropolitan area. Since the Housing Act
of 1974 has the purpose of alleviating the sub-standard living condi-
tions in urban areas, 436
 such plaintiffs could easily satisfy the require-
ment that they be within the zone of interests of the Act. In addition,
the plaintiffs could satisfy the injury in fact requirement of Warth if
they allege (1) that they suffer an injury based on their sub-standard
living conditions, and (2) that as a result of the "urgent needs "437 of
their community, they have a legitimate expectation that the chal-
lenged funds will be reallocated to their community. This would
satisfy the minimum constitutional requirement of an injury in fact
outlined in Warth, since the plaintiffs will have demonstrated the dis-
tinct and palpable injury of perpetuation of their sub-standard living
conditions which, but for the actions of HUD, would have been al-
leviated. Thus, there would be a true case or controversy between the
plaintiffs and HUD.
A city could similarly establish standing under the approach and
under the conditions outlined above. Its "injury" would be the exis-
tence of urban blight which would have been partially alleviated if the
challenged HUD funds had been reallocated to meet the city's urgent
needs. Builders and developers, however, could not achieve standing
since they are not even arguably within the zone of interests of the
Housing Act of 1974.
4 " See Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls
and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 487 & n.13 (1973).
'34 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
435
 See text at notes 373-77 and note 367 supra.
435
 42 U.S.C. 5301(c) (Supp. 1975).
4 " See text at notes 390-92 supra for a discussion of the "urgent needs" require-
ment.
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There is one factor which limits, somewhat, the efficacy of the
indirect approach. Once the plaintiffs establish standing, they need to
demonstrate that HUD's approval of the challenged grant was
improper to obtain the injunctive relief requested. This was easy to
prove in the Hartford situation where most of the suburban com-
munities claimed that they had absolutely no need for low-income
housing. These suburbs thus clearly violated the statutory require-
ment that they accurately assess the housing needs of low-income per-
sons in their community.438 Therefore, HUD's, approval of funds to
these suburbs was clearly improper.
An inaccurate but nonetheless positive declaration of community
need might pose greater problems to challengers, however. The
Hartford court also granted an injunction against funds allocated to
East Hartford, a suburb which had submitted an estimate of its need
for low-income housing. 43 " The court determined that the estimate
was too low, based on the facts and data available to HUD and East
Hartford at the time of the application, and concluded that HUD's
approval of the funding application was improper. 440 The court held
that "HUD was doubly at fault—it did not obtain the generally avail-
able information required for a proper review, and it acted upon the
basis of inadequate information. "44 1 This, the court indicated,
amounted to "arbitrary and capricious decision-making" 442 and an ab-
dication of its responsibilities under the Housing Act of 1974. 443 The
Hartford court thus seems to have undertaken quite an active review
of HUD's approval of East Hartford's funds, a role which other courts
may decline to emulate. Under the Housing Act of 1974, HUD may
disapprove applicatiOns only if (1) a community's assessment of its
needs is "plainly inconsistent" with the significant facts or data gener-
ally available concerning the community's housing needs; (2) HUD
determines that the proposed project is "plainly inappropriate" to
meet the community's needs; or (3) the application does not fulfill the
statutory requirements. 444 Congress thus seems to have limited HUD's
ability to disapprove funding to instances of flagrant violations. The
courts may enjoin allocations of funds only insofar as HUD was able
to disapprove the original application. To the extent that other courts
may be more restrained than the court in Hartford in their assessment
of what is "plainly inconsistent" or "plainly inappropriate" in a
community's assessment of its needs, plaintiffs will find a HUD alloca-
tion less open to challenge.
Plaintiffs who bring suit under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 would encounter similar problems. Although low-income
43" 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (Supp. 1975).
43" Hartford slip opinion at 35, 41,
441  Id. at 35.
4" Id. at 32.
442 id.
493 Id, at 37.
444 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (Supp. 1975).
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plaintiffs of a neighboring metropolitan community might achieve
standing based on HUD's alleged failure to "affirmatively administer"
the community development program of the Housing Act of 1974, a
court's review of agency action is quite narrow. Thus it is unlikely that
a plaintiff could convince a court to "substitute its judgment for that
of the agency"445
 unless the agency's decision was arbitrary or
capricious. 446
Two further problems limit the efficacy of the indirect challenge
to exclusionary zoning. First, some of the wealthier and more exclu-
sively zoned communities may decide against applying for federal
funds in order to avoid the necessity of providing for low-income
housing within their communities. This approach has already been
taken by the towns of both Berwyn and Cicero, Illinois. 447 Second,
some exclusively zoned communities which have no employment op-
portunities for low-income individuals may be able to
claim—legitimately--that they have no need for low-income housing.
Thus they might qualify for federal funding under the Housing Act
even though they have no plan for providing low-income housing. 448
The end result in either case is that the most exclusively zoned com-
munities may remain immune to an indirect challenge aimed at fed-
eral funding.
CONCLUSION
In the area of exclusionary zoning practices, the Supreme
Court's treatment of Article III requirements and its concern with
jurisprudential limitations forecloses the possibility of the sort of
sweeping reform brought about by the landmark decisions of Baker v.
Carr449 and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 45° The Court is
clearly confining its role to a case by case analysis; it appears willing to
correct specific wrongs but is unlikely to reach a comprehensive con-
clusion that exclusionary zoning per se is unconstitutional.
Even within the confines of an individual case, the litigant at-
tempting to challenge exclusionary zoning is faced with the heavy
burden of alleging in the pleading facts from which the court may
clearly see a personal palpable injury which is directly caused by the
challenged actions and which may be appropriately remedied by the
exercise of judicial power. As Warth indicates, this showing is constitu-
tionally mandated by Article III and thus necessary in both statutory
"5
 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
446
 See generally McCabe, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: A Survey of Recent
Developments, 25 ADMIN. L. REV. 375, 402-04 (1973) for a discussion of recent cases illus-
trating the extent to which the courts have been willing to defer to agency discretion.
447
 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN:
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 61 n.191 (1975).
446 1d. at 61.
4" 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voting reapportionment).
456
 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial desegregation in public schools).
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and nonstatutory review situations."' As a result of this expansion of
Article 111 requirements, the practical differences between a statutory
and nonstatutory assertion of standing have been narrowed. Whether
or not there is a statutory grant of standing facilitating a challenge to
exclusionary zoning, the litigant will be allowed to present the merits
of the claim only in the precise factual circumstances reviewed above,
and only on the basis of a complaint which carefully sets forth these
necessary facts.
ANNE JOSEPHSON
ALICE SESSIONS LONOFF
"' The statutory/nonstatutory review distinction still is used by the Court for ap-
plying its jurisprudential considerations.
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